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HOPE WE DIE BEFORE WE GET
OLD: THE ATTACK ON RETIREMENT
Patricia E. Dilley
The American institution of retirement has sustained numerous attacks over the last
twenty years, to the extent that it may cease to exist by the time most of today's
workers reach their midsixties. Professor Patricia Dilley describes how all of the
components of the "three-legged stool" that represents private pensions, personal
savings, and Social Security, have declined so significantly in recent years that the
combination may not be able to provide support for the elderly in the future,
particularly those retired seniors who are in the lower and middle classes. Changes in
employment policies, the markets for retirement savings investment, and the public
policy surrounding the Social Security debate threaten the mainstays of golden years
income upon which Americans have come to rely. Professor Dilley explains that
previous civilizations were able to sustain the elderly members of their populations
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before retirement became the entitlement that it is today, but that the older members of
those societies worked long past what is now deemed appropriate retirement ages and
often relied upon family members or charity for support after they could no longer
remain actively employed. She warns that unless retirement systems focus on a
greater redistribution of resources from wealthy workers to poor ones, the lower- and
middle-income work force will not be able to survive a retirement from work in their
later years. Further, Professor Dilley argues that modern sociey need not declare a
particular "retirement age" and that the system may work better if the elderly work as
long as they can before retiring to certain financial support for their final years. She
concludes by suggesting a two-part, citizen-based reform program in which Social
Security and social insurance would expand to fill in the gap left by shrinking
employer-based pension plans while allowing individual decisions about when
retirement is most appropriate for each worker.
"People try to put us down
Just because we get around
Things they do look awful cold
Hope I die before I get old"
"My Generation"
The Who1
When The Who sang "My Generation" in 1965,
they expressed the defiance of the baby boom generation in the face of
what seemed to be their parents' generation's post-war complacency
and love of conformity. Thirty-five years later, however, these words
have considerable resonance in quite another context-in a nutshell,
"hope I die before I get old" is the default retirement strategy for
millions of their baby boomer compeers.
The United States is in a rapid retreat from the fifty-year-old in-
stitution of retirement as a right for workers at virtually all income
levels. The combination of the implosion of the private pension sys-
tem, the failure of market regulation to prevent corruption and self-
dealing in the management of retirement savings in company plans,
as well as in mutual funds, and proposals to "privatize" Social Secu-
rity, may spell the end of retirement as Americans have come to know
it in the post-World War II era. Adding to the mix are the precipitous
rise in health care costs, the concomitant precariousness of the Medi-
care system's financing, and the repeated rounds of tax cuts that have
lead to increasing deficits and mounting national debt that will be-
1. The Who, My Generation, on MY GENERATION (Brunswick Records 1965).
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come particularly critical at just the time of the scheduled retirement
of the baby boom generation.2
Taken together, most of the trends in retirement policy and legis-
lation over the last twenty years coalesce toward one end: elimination
of public and private entitlement to a stream of income in retirement,
in favor of preretirement accumulation of assets that are supposed to
sustain the retiree until the end of life.3 The change from traditional
defined benefit (DB) plans to various types of employer-sponsored
employee savings plans, such as § 401(k) cash or deferred arrange-
ments, leads inexorably to a transfer of risk from groups to individu-
als, and to a reliance on advance capital accumulation, rather than on
transfer payments, to fund maintenance in old age.
It is critically necessary to reexamine the realities behind this
current national fantasy of individual self-financed retirement for all
workers. If current trends continue, today's workers will find them-
selves back in the pre-Social Security era-when older workers of
moderate to modest means did not retire because they could not af-
ford to, and once they could no longer work, lived in old age on the
sufferance of family members or public charity, once their own mea-
ger savings were exhausted.4
2. See Michael Aneiro, Rising Health Care Costs Could Ease in 2005, INC, Oct. 7,
2004, available at http://www.inc.com/criticanews/articles/200410/healthcare.
html; Jonathan Weisman, $2.3 Trillion in New Debt Expected by 2014, WASH. POST,
Sept. 8, 2004, at A2; Robert E. Moffit & Brian M. Riedl, Medicare's Deepening Finan-
cial Crisis: The High Price of Fiscal Irresponsibility, THE HERITAGE FOUND. POL'Y RES.
& ANALYSIS, Mar. 25, 2004, at http://www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/
bg1740.cfm.
3. The latest statistics from the Department of Labor's Form 5500 report
shows that between 1975 and 1998, defined contribution plans (which are essen-
tially employer sponsored savings accounts and provide the employee only the
accumulated amounts plus or minus investment increases or losses) as a percent-
age of all pension arrangements grew from accounting for less than thirty percent
of active participants to almost seventy percent. Similarly, § 401(k) plans, the most
popular form of defined contribution plans, increased from about twenty-five per-
cent of active participants in 1975 to over seventy percent in 1998. See Alicia Mun-
nell et al., An Update on Employer-Sponsored Pensions, Address at
the... Conversation on Coverage: National Policy Forum at the National Press
Club 7-9 (July 22, 2004) (transcript on file with author).
4. See generally CAROLE HABER & BRIAN GRATTON, OLD AGE AND THE
SEARCH FOR SECURTY: AN AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY 88-89 (1994).
In the history of work, as in the history of economic well-being, Social
Security emerges as the decisive catalyst of change. Until this legisla-
tion was enacted, most men and women retained occupational roles
well into old age.... Hidden in the obscure labor markets of the pre-
industrial period, unemployed or underemployed older workers
emerged as a distinct social problem in urban, industrial America.
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In fact, there has never been any real possibility that individual
middle- and low-income workers could finance their own financially
comfortable retirements at what most people consider a normal re-
tirement age. Retirement as we know it today did not exist in Amer-
ica prior to the institution of Social Security in 1935, and no industrial-
ized nation has ever maintained a broad-based retirement system for
workers at all income levels without some sort of social insurance sys-
tem that spreads the risk of poverty in old age across the working
population through the tax system.5 What really distinguishes mod-
em retirement and care for the aging from the experience of civiliza-
tions during the rest of human history, stretching at least back to
Mesopotamia five thousand years ago, is the socialization of the aging
dependency burden, the de-personalization of financial support for
the elderly, and the expansion of work-based retirement benefits to
provide basic old-age income support for most of the elderly.6
The spreading of the risk of inability to work in old age has, in-
tentionally or not, created retirement as a sustained period of leisure
in advance of physical and mental disability. The greater the degree
of socialization of the financial responsibility for providing for the
elderly, the greater the degree of independence of elderly individuals,
both from their children and other relatives, and from the need to
Id.; see also ANN S. ORLOFF, THE POLITICS OF PENSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF BRITAIN, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 1880-1940, at 7 (1993).
In theory, the elderly [in the period between 1880 and WWII] could be
aided in their own homes; this practice was called outdoor relief. In
North America, and in England by the 1870s, outdoor relief would not
be offered until any possible support from relatives was extracted,
and recipients often might be required to pay back their doles out of
any estates they might leave after their deaths. Toward the end of the
nineteenth century, institutionalization within public poor relief insti-
tutions-so-called indoor relief-became more and more common for
the aged poor, particularly for those who had no kin or whose rela-
tives could not be coerced into supporting them by poor law authori-
ties.
5. 1 discuss later in this article the origins of the American public redistribu-
tive pension program in the form of the Civil War pension system for Union sol-
diers. For the European experience, see generally PAT THANE, OLD AGE IN
ENGLISH HISTORY: PAST EXPERIENCES, PRESENT ISSUES 194-235 (2000). "As formal
pension schemes gradually became a normal feature of the life-courses of most
English people, they changed these lives by, for the first time, guaranteeing a right
to a secure, if small, income at a fixed age." Id. at 236; see also ORLOFF, supra note 4,
at 7-11 (analyzing replacement of poor relief with social insurance approaches).
6. See generally RIVKAH HARRIS, GENDER AND AGING IN MESOPOTAMIA: THE
GILGAMESH EPIC AND OTHER ANCIENT LITERATURE 50-66 (2000).
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work even if they are still physically and mentally able.7 Retirement
has become our way of caring for the elderly, with work no longer ex-
pected of the old, and charity care for the very needy occupying a de-
spised place as an option of last resort.
In this article, I explore the degree to which the institution of
voluntary retirement at a relatively young age-the midsixties-is vi-
able in the wake of changes now occurring in the public and private
systems, and whether it is possible to eliminate our current retirement
income systems without reintroducing widespread poverty in old age.
There is more at stake in this change, however, than simply the future
of retirement. To a substantial extent, the entire middle-class culture
of the United States in the latter half of the twentieth century was
based on the premise of a secure and independent old age for middle-
and working-class people, based on the certainty of monthly income
from Social Security and private pension plans.8
This article examines the different manifestations of this attack
on retirement, beginning with current problems with our employ-
ment-based retirement system, including employer-sponsored pen-
sion plans, employer-based and individual retirement savings ar-
rangements, and proposals to privatize Social Security. I argue that in
all of these areas, the push away from group redistributive arrange-
ments and toward individual capital accumulation would, if success-
ful, mean the end of middle- and working-class retirement as the ex-
pectation, and realized goal, of most workers.
I then turn to the historical record to examine what the future of
aging in America might look like in the absence of redistributive pub-
lic retirement pension systems. Contrary to popular belief, aging has
been viewed as beginning at around age sixty for thousands of years
and the elderly have comprised a more than insignificant portion of
the population, at least back to classical Roman times.9 Historically,
7. See generally Aaron Lucchetti, Tough Sell: Lighten up on Employer Stock,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2003.
8. See generally MELISSA A. HARDY, AM. SOC'Y ON AGING, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF RETIREMENT IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA: FROM
DISCONTENT TO SATISFACTION (2002), at http://www.generationsjournal.org/
gen26-2/article.html.
9. See KAREN COKAYNE, EXPERIENCING OLD AGE IN ANCIENT ROME 1 (2003).
The ages of life were theoretical, but could have a practical applica-
tion .... From these age divisions, it can be seen that what was con-
sidered old varied .... But from around the first century BC onwards,
the age of sixty or sixty-five was commonly mentioned as the thresh-
old of old age. Sixty (or sometimes sixty-five) was also the age at
NUMBER 2
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however, retirement was the preserve of the wealthy and politically
powerful--old people of the laboring classes were expected to work,
and if not able to work, to survive on charity or the largesse of family
members."
The great innovation of the twentieth century was the democra-
tization of retirement and the substitution of broad based retirement
systems for the historical pattern of work and poverty in the elderly
working population coupled with retirement only for the well off."
The revolution in aging in the last century was the extension of the re-
tirement choice, along with continued independence in living ar-
rangements, to those at all or at least most economic levels. 2 The
question Americans now face is whether the attack on twentieth cen-
tury retirement institutions will mean a return to the historic pattern
of inequality in access to retirement.
I. The Current Attack on Retirement
Amidst all the public hand-wringing about how we will pay for
the retirement of the baby boom, a quiet undermining of the major pil-
lars of retirement over the last seventy years--employer provided
pension plans and Social Security-has been taking place both in the
private marketplace and in Congress. The attack on Social Security
has so far been more theoretical than real, 3 but President Bush has
which one could be exempted from certain legal and public obliga-
tions .... However, the threshold for allowances was much lower if
the activity, or duty, depended primarily on physical vigour .... [A]
man was thought to be no longer fit for military purposes at the age of
50, unless there was a crisis.
Id. Not much has changed in the succeeding 2100 years. For example, the Florida
state retirement plan for police and firefighters sets the normal retirement age at
fifty-five with ten years of service or fifty-two with twenty-five years of service.
See FLA. DEP'T OF MGMT. SERVS. Div. OF RET., MPF OVERVIEW, at http://www.
frs.state.fl.us/frs/mpf/MPF-Overview.html.
10. See discussion infra notes 168-96.
11. Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of
Social Security Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REV. 975, 981-82 (2000).
12. Id.
13. Privatization proposals have proliferated since the mid-1970s, with the
beginning of the predictions of Social Security's financial downfall, but little action
has been taken on any of them. See generally Martin S. Feldstein, Toward a Reform of
Social Security, 40 PUB. INT. (1975) (one of the earliest salvos). See also MARTIN S.
FELDSTEIN, THE MISSING PIECE IN POLICY ANALYSIS: SOCIAL SECURrIY REFORM 24
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5413, 1996); PETER J. FERRARA,
SOCIAL SECURITY: THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION 311 (1980); Laurence J. Kotlikoff,
Privatizing Social Security at Home and Abroad, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 368, 370 (1996);
Lewis D. Solomon & Geoffrey A. Barrow, National Issues: Privatization of Social Se-
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made privatization a top priority for his second term and 2005 will see
at least substantial discussion of the idea, if not congressional action
on legislation establishing private accounts. 4 However, congressional
actions taken over the past decade under the guise of strengthening
retirement savings15 have in fact encouraged employers to abandon
traditional pension plans in favor of savings plans that put all the
onus of financing retirement on the employee.16 Even legislation os-
tensibly designed to promote retirement savings turns out, on closer
examination, to encourage tax-favored savings for short-term needs,
like education or housing, in a way that inevitably favors higher in-
come workers."
It is important to separate reality from rhetoric about increasing
savings for retirement that is used to promote legislation like the
Portman-Carding pension reform bills"8 and "pension" arrangements
like cash balance plans. While the stated goal of most of these plans is
to improve the retirement prospects for all Americans, the reality is
that they inevitably undermine the possibility of stable retirement in-
come for lower- and middle-income workers, making it much more
likely that retirement simply will not be possible for those groups.
A. Undermining the Private Pension System
Public media expressions of the baby boom generation's fear
about whether they will be able to retire the way their parents' gen-
eration did has for the last decade or more centered on Social Security
and predictions of its failure or inadequacy.19 However, the most im-
curity: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 23 (1995); Sylvester J.
Schieber & John B. Shoven, Social Security Reform: Around the World in 80 Ways, 86
AM. ECON. REV. 373, 376 (1996).
14. See Editorial, The Social Security Fear Factor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2005, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/03/opinion/03monl.html [hereinafter
Social Security Fear].
15. See Pension Preservation and Savings Expansion Act of 2003, H.R. 1776,
108th Cong. (2003).
16. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
17. See infra note 42.
18. The most recent version of this legislation, and the one to which this arti-
cle refers throughout, is the Pension Preservation and Savings Expansion Act of
2003, H.R. 1776, 108th Cong. (2003).
19. Campaigning on Social Security, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2000, at A14; Lou
Dobbs, Time to Touch the Third Rail, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 13, 2004, at 45;
Don Ezra, Social Security Could Leave Many Stranded on the Road to Retirement,
INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Apr. 30, 2001, at 46; Andrew Goldstein, Social Security: Does
the Nation's Oldest, Most Successful Social Program Need a Complete Overhaul--or Just
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mediate crisis is in the private employer-provided pension system,
which is suffering both from legislative attack in the guise of reform
and abandonment by employers who are reluctant to commit to long-
term pension promises for their employees.
Modem retirement was structured beginning early in the twen-
tieth century around a tripartite system of private pensions, personal
savings, and Social Security-the traditional "three-legged stool"
metaphor widely used by pension analysts.2' The private pension leg
of this stool has morphed into two general types of employer pro-
vided retirement plans. The first is the traditional pension plan,
which relies primarily on employer funding.21 The second is the now
more common employer-sponsored individual savings plans, such as
401(k) plans or employer-sponsored individual retirement accounts
(IRAs), which include simplified employer plans (SEPs), based pri-
marily on employee savings through salary deduction.2
The traditional defined benefit pension plan was based on the
principle of risk-spreading across a pool of employees; an employer's
pension plan was usually completely funded by employer contribu-
tions, earnings on the investment of those contributions, and forfei-
tures of accrued benefits by employees who left the employer before
becoming vested in those benefits.2 Defined contribution (DC) plans,
on the other hand, place all risk of loss in the individual employee, be-
an Infusion of Money?, TIME MAG., Oct. 9, 2000, at 54; Carolyn Lochhead, Greenspan
Urges Fast Action to Save Social Security, S. F. CHRON., Nov. 21, 1997, at A3; Retire-
ment Age May Go Up; Official Blames Baby Boomers' Good Health, HOUSING CHRON.,
Nov. 4, 1993, at A9; Charles E. Rounds, Jr., You Have No Legal Right to Social Secu-
rity, CONSUMER RES. MAG., June 1, 2000, at 22; Social Insecurity, PUB. PERSP.,
Nov./Dec. 2002, at 47; Walter Upgrave, Your Greatest Retirement Fear; Can You
Count on Social Security? We Size up the Health of the System and Look at What the Pro-
posals to Fix it Would Mean to You, MONEY, Fall 2002, at 112.
20. See Regina Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans 4 FLA.
TAX REV. 607,683 n.17 (2000).
21. Id. at 610.
22. A cash or deferred arrangement provides employees the option of receiv-
ing a certain amount as income or electing to have the employer make a contribu-
tion to the plan on behalf of the employee. I.R.C. § 401(k)(2) (2004). Employees of
§ 501(c)(3) tax exempt organizations and § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) education organizations
can have § 401(k)-type plans under § 403(b). I.R.C. § 403(b). Under a Simplified
Employee Pension, the employer sets up IRAs for each employee. I.R.C.
§ 408(k)(2). Then, following a written allocation formula, the employer makes con-
tributions to each employee's account which bear a uniform relationship to each
employee's compensation that is not in excess of $200,000. Id.
23. For an exhaustive discussion of plan funding methods and elements, see
DAN M. McGILL et al., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 201-336 (7th ed.
1996).
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cause no specific benefit has been promised, and employees are only
entitled to whatever amounts are in their accounts when they retire, or
otherwise terminate participation in the plan.24
The twentieth century retirement model served the purposes of
employers and workers alike. Employers used the promise of pen-
sions to retain valuable employees, stabilize their work force and, in
some cases, stave off union organization.2" The pension promise in-
duced employees to stay until retirement, and then move on, without
the need for morale-lowering layoffs or individual firings.2 6 Employ-
ees received both a stable source of income in retirement, for them-
selves and their surviving spouses, and the ability to plan when to
stop working, instead of simply working until they either lost their job
or became unable to work because of infirmity or illness.27
As we move further into the twenty-first century, however, that
model appears to be collapsing. Changes in the structure of employ-
ment and of businesses have led to employers who do not particularly
care about keeping long-term employees or maintaining good rela-
tions with employees, and to employees who do not value pension
promises and who do not anticipate staying in any one job long
enough for those promises to mean anything in the long run.
Actions by Congress and the executive branch have accelerated
the tendency of employers to shy away from establishing traditionally
defined benefit plans, and move toward less secure, less expensive de-
fined contribution plans.28 Private consultants have aided employers
in developing alternatives to true pension plans that provide lower
benefits to employees at lower cost to the company.29 As a bonus,
these new arrangements satisfy a younger, more mobile work force
with account balances that they can control and easily cash out when
moving to a new job.3"
24. Id. at 247.
25. See COLIN GORDON, NEW DEALS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN
AMERICA, 1920-1935, at 242-53 (1994).
26. Id. "Employment benefits and wages deferred to pensions, savings or
company stock encouraged workers to equate their own economic future with the
prosperity and good favor of their employers." Id. at 243.
27. Id.
28. Edward N. Wolff, The Unraveling of the American Pension System 1983-2001,
in NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., IN SEARCH OF RETIREMENT SECURITY: THE CHANGING
MIX OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 16
(Nelly Ganesan & Teresa Ghilarducci eds.) (forthcoming).
29. Id. at 17.
30. Id. at 16.
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This section examines what is happening to the employer-
provided pension system, and the various factors that might be re-
sponsible for its disintegration. Changes in the American workplace
might well have forced changes in the defined benefit lifetime annuity
model in any event-but clearly employers, consultants, and legisla-
tors have contributed to the effort.
1. CURRENT TRENDS IN PENSION SYSTEMS
The change from defined benefit pension plans to various types
of defined contribution, or essentially employee savings plans, has
been underway for decades, but has probably greatly accelerated in
the last twenty years. Some of the possible causes for the transition
are discussed below, but first it is necessary to see what the change
has actually been, and what the effects of the turn away from tradi-
tional pension plans are on actual worker pensions.
Recent studies have found that the percentage of households
with workers age forty-seven to sixty-four participating or vested in
some way in defined benefit plans dropped from sixty-nine percent in
1983 to forty-five percent in 2001, while the same age group's percent-
age participating in defined contribution plans increased from twelve
percent to sixty-two percent.31 Overall pension participation in all
types of plans for nonagricultural wage and salary workers in the pri-
vate sector aged twenty-five to sixty-four, declined from fifty-one per-
cent in 1979 to forty-six percent in 2002.32 In 2003, while fifty-seven
percent of American workers were employed by companies sponsor-
ing some sort of pension plan, only forty-nine percent of workers
were participating in these plans.33
Just as important as the raw numbers for participation, however,
is the effect of the decline of the defined benefit plan and overall pen-
sion participation on the retirement prospects of American workers at
lower income levels. Edward Wolff's study, in particular, focuses on
"pension wealth" and the effect of the switch to defined contribution
plans on the distribution of wealth and income generally. 34 He found
that when looking at overall pension wealth, the decrease in defined
31. Id. at 1, 10.
32. Munnell et al., supra note 3, at 2.
33. Id. § 6 at 1. (noting the very large gap in coverage between full-time
workers-fifty-three percent-and part-time workers-eighteen percent).
34. Wolff, supra note 28, at 1.
VOLUME 12
HOPE WE DIE BEFORE WE GET OLD 255
benefit plans was more or less compensated for by the increase in de-
fined contribution plans.35 However,
[tihe story looks somewhat different when we look at the trend in
median values, the trends experienced by most people who do not
have extreme amounts of wealth. Among age group forty-seven
to sixty-four, median pension wealth increased by a much more
modest eighteen percent, from $42,400 to $50,000. Moreover, me-
dian net worth excluding DC pension plans fell by 4.3% between
1983 and 2001. Altogether, median Private Accumulations fell by
2.2% for those aged forty-seven to sixty-four.
The inequality of total pension wealth increased sharply be-
tween 1983 and 2001. This trend is traceable to the switchover
from DB plans to DC accounts.
36
Wolff's study reveals that while traditional defined benefit plans
had an equalizing effect on overall household wealth, the switch to
defined contribution plans has had the opposite effect. As he points
out, this occurred even as the switch was taking place during a his-
torically long and vigorous bull market, when one might have ex-
pected that the proliferation of 401(k) plans for middle-income work-
ers would have allowed them to participate more fully in the market's
gains. Nonetheless, "the wealth holdings of middle-aged households
did not improve. Indeed, median Private Accumulations actually de-
teriorated slightly over the 1983-2001 period."3 7 Wolff concludes:
Indeed, the devolution of the traditional pension system of the
1980s and 1990s has left many families unprepared to meet [the]
challenges of retirement. Despite the hype, the switchover from
DB to DC has not benefited the average family-it has hurt the
average family instead. The shift from DB to DC plans is part of
the general unraveling of the "worker safety net."w
Similar alarms are sounded in the coverage study by Alicia
Munnell and her coauthors. They found that pension plan participa-
tion for all workers is concentrated among workers in the top forty
percent of earnings--over sixty percent of male workers in the top
two quintiles of earnings participated in pension plans in 2002 (down
from almost or over seventy percent in 1979), while only somewhat
more than thirty percent of workers in the fourth quintile, and less
than twenty percent of workers in the bottom quintile participated in
plans.3 9 The figures for women are similar-sixty percent of female
35. Id.
36. Id. at 14.
37. Id. at 15.
38. Id.
39. Munnell et al., supra note 3, at fig. 2a.
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workers in the top quintile participated in pension plans in 2002,
while about ten percent of women in the bottom quintile were cov-
ered.4"
Even for those who are already retired, the private pension sys-
tem is clearly skewed in favor of higher-income retirees, a result that
comes as no surprise to anyone who looks at the structure of tax in-
centives designed to encourage employers to establish private pen-
sions. The private system is based on a set of tax inducements which
give a deduction to employers for current contributions to pension
plans, and exclusion of those contributions from income for the em-
ployees participating in those plans until they actually receive their
benefits in retirement.4 Given the progressive income tax structure
40. Id. at 2-4. These figures are a slight increase from the 1979 figures for
women, apparently caused by women's greater entry into the paid labor force over
this period and the greater prevalence of part-time work for women. This study
also found somewhat higher numbers for pension coverage rates, under some type
of plan either DB or DC, on a lifetime and household basis-for households aged
fifty-nine to sixty-nine, about sixty percent had some sort of coverage in 2000. But
the disparity between high- and low-income households is stark-about seventy-
seven percent in the top two quintiles in income were covered, compared to less
than twenty-five percent for the bottom quintile. Id. at 4-5.
41. As part of the rules for a plan to qualify for preferential tax treatment,
employers are provided a current deduction for contributions on behalf of each
employee which is expressed as a percentage of the employee's overall compensa-
tion. I.R.C. § 404(a)(3) (2004) and I.R.C. § 401(k)(11). For a plan to qualify, the lim-
its on the annual benefits in a defined benefit plan is expressed as the lesser of
$160,000 or the average compensation for the employee participant's three highest
years of compensation. I.R.C. § 415(b). For a 401(k) plan, the limit for acceptable
employer contributions is the lesser of $40,000 or one hundred percent of the em-
ployee's compensation. I.R.C. § 415(c). In absence of specific legislation, the doc-
trine of constructive receipt would apply to cause the employer contributions on
behalf of the employee to be included in the employee's gross income. The con-
structive receipt doctrine is set out in the regulations. In the regulation § 1.446-
1(c)(1)(i) cash method, the taxpayer must include amounts in her gross income
when they are actually or constructively received. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (as
amended in 2003). The regulations later go on to describe the constructive receipt
of income as "[i]ncome although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is
constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is credited to his
account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may draw upon
it at any time, or so that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if
notice of intention to withdraw had been given." Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as
amended in 1979). The "made available" language in the regulation does not ap-
ply to amounts held in a qualified plan under 402(a) after it was amended by the
Economic Recovery Act of 1981. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation,
section 402(a) was amended so as to prevent the application of the constructive
receipt doctrine to cause the inclusion of unpaid, but eligible for distribution,
amounts in the retired employee's gross income. Joint Comm. on Taxation, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., General Explanation of the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 214
(Comm. Print. 1981), cited with approval in Clayton v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 628,
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still in place, the higher an individual's income is, the more valuable
that tax deferral is for them. For low-income workers, the deferral is
of little value; most low-income workers would rather have that de-
ferred income now to pay for current needs.42
As a result of this skewed distribution of the benefit of pension
plans, lower-income retirees have far less pension income than work-
ers at higher income levels do.
As of now, however, the private retirement system has failed the
lower earners. In reality, at any one time, at best no more than
fifty percent of the workforce is participating in employer-based
plans. Importantly, for those who end up in the bottom forty per-
cent of the income distribution after retirement, employer-based
plans are largely irrelevant. For those over age sixty-five in 1996,
pensions accounted for only three percent of the retirement in-
come of the lowest quintile, and seven percent of the income of
the second-lowest quintile.43
Daniel Halperin attributes this result to many factors-limited
coverage of pension plans even at their peak years of coverage, ac-
crued benefits forfeited because of changing employers, premature
loss of pension benefits through early cash-outs and subsequent in-
vestment losses, and inadequate benefit amounts even for those cov-
ered by plans, among other factors." The factors he cites all apply to
both defined benefit and defined contribution plans, but the risk of
loss of benefits is much higher for the defined contribution plans now
dominating the pension landscape. Thus, the future adequacy of pen-
sion savings for workers at or below the median earning level is
unlikely to show improvement.
Clearly, the decline of traditional pension plans is real, and the
growth in defined contribution plans--essentially employer-provided
employee savings plans-has not compensated for the decline for
workers below the median income level. While higher income work-
ers have probably benefited to some extent from the ability to invest
636 (Fed. Cl. 1995). The amended § 402(a) causes distributions from a § 401(a)
qualified trust to be taxed under § 72 when actually distributed. I.R.C. § 402(a).
42. Sondra G. Beverly & Michael Sherraden, Institutional Determinates of Sav-
ings: Implications for Low-Income Households and Public Policy, 28 J. SOCIO-ECON. 457
(1999); STEVEN F. VENTI & DAVID A. WISE, CHOICE, CHANCE, AND WEALTH
DISPERSION AT RETIREMENT (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7521, 2000); Edward N. Wolff, How the Pie Is Sliced: America's Growing Concentration
of Wealth, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1995, at 58; James P. Ziliak, Income Transfers and
Assets of the Poor, REV. ECON. & STAT., Feb. 2003, at 63.
43. Daniel Halperin, Employer-Based Retirement Income-The Ideal, the Possible,
and the Reality, 11 ELDER L.J. 37, 43 (2003).
44. Id.
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their deferred wages in the stock market during its boom years, that
advantage has apparently not trickled down to the average or low in-
come worker.
2. CHANGING WORK FORCE, DECLINING PENSION COVERAGE
Pension analysts have presented a multitude of possible causes
for the decline in pension coverage-desire of employers to cut costs,
reluctance of employers to commit to a long-term pension promise
that younger employees do not value particularly highly, and an in-
creasing regulatory burden placed particularly on defined benefit
plans by provisions in the tax code.4" All of these factors undoubtedly
play a role; what they all have in common is the change in employer
goals. Many employers have gone from wanting, early in the last cen-
tury, to retain employees for the long term to wanting, early in this
century, no ties or commitments to employees beyond the current
paycheck.
The traditional pension was used, beginning in the late nine-
teenth century and continuing into the twentieth, for a variety of em-
ployer purposes-to reward long-term valuable employees and keep
45. See Daniel Halperin, Special Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement
Programs: Is It "Still" Viable as a Means of Increasing Retirement Income? Should It
Continue?, 49 TAx L. REV. 1 (1993).
The qualified plan, however, has another string to its bow. As ex-
plained, to qualify for this special treatment, plans must provide cov-
erage to at least some non-highly paid employees. Since the highly
paid would be expected to save for retirement and would obviously
prefer to do so in a tax-favored form, they can be expected, as the de-
cisionmakers, to force coverage throughout the workforce. Involun-
tary coverage of employees, who may not desire deferred compensa-
tion is not, however, without its costs. These employees may attribute
little or no value to plan contributions (even with tax benefits at-
tached). Employees may expect to leave before benefits become non-
forfeitable. More generally, they may not feel that this is the time to
provide for retirement. Lower income employees cannot be expected
to provide for the future when current income is barely adequate for a
minimum standard of living. In these situations, employees would be
unwilling to accept a reduction in current wages. They would seek
work elsewhere or remain unemployed. In fact, those groups whose
labor supply is most elastic, teenagers and second earners in particu-
lar, might have the least interest in retirement savings.
Id. at 14; see also Norman Stein & Patricia Dilley, Leverage, Linkage, and Leakage:
Problems with the Private Pension System and How They Should Inform the Social Secu-
rity Reform Debate, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1369, 1378-81 (2001); Edward A. Ze-
linsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683, 704-05 (2000) (discussing
reasons why employers would switch from traditional defined benefit plans to
cash balance plans which are based on defined contribution concepts).
VOLUME 12
HOPE WE DIE BEFORE WE GET OLD 259
them with the company until retirement, to prevent unionization
drives, and to "rationalize" the process of easing older employees out
of the work force.46 As unions came to represent a large portion of
manufacturing workers in large companies in the immediate post-
World War II era, pensions became a principal bargaining issue, a de-
gree of financial security which workers highly valued and were will-
ing to sacrifice some current compensation to maintain.4 7 Workers
who expected to work for one employer for most of their lives were
more willing to rely on future pension promises, and those promises
were more valuable for such workers given the structure of typical de-
fined benefit pension plan formulae.48
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, patterns of em-
ployment look very different. The large stable manufacturing work
forces still exist in selected industries such as automobile manufactur-
ing. But, as heavy manufacturing jobs have shifted overseas over the
past thirty years, union representation has declined and with it, so has
much of the pressure for stable defined benefit pension plan cover-
age. 9 Workers no longer expect to work for one employer for longer
than five years, at least until they reach their late forties and early fif-
ties, the point at which changing jobs is no longer as easy."
A complete analysis of the changing nature of work in America
is beyond the scope of this essay. For example, the overseas outsourc-
ing of jobs ranging from low-skilled manufacturing to highly skilled
46. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 6-10 (3d ed. 2000) (citing WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P.
KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1976)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, union membership for wage
and salary workers fell to 12.9% of the total workforce in 2003. This represents a
7.2% decrease from just twenty years earlier in 1983 when 20.1% of wage and sal-
ary workers were union members. While union membership for government
workers has remained relatively constant since 1983, this decline in union mem-
bership is attributable to the decrease in union membership of workers in the pri-
vate sector. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., UNION MEMBERSHIP IN 2003
(2004), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr.htm.
50. Daniel Polsky, Changing Consequences of Job Separation in the United States,
52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 565 (1999) (discussing the increase of involuntary job
loss for older employees and a decreased rate of reemployment for these employ-
ees); Daniel Rodriguez & Madeline Zavodny, Are Displaced Workers Now Finished at
Forty?, 85 ECON. REV. 33 (2000); Madeline Zavodny, Technology and Job Separation
Among Young Adults, 41 ECON. INQUIRY, 264-65, 276 (2003) (concluding that tech-
nology causes job separation of young adults (defined as late teens to midthirties)
to be more often voluntary than involuntary by remaining at the same job for less
than two years).
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technical and professional work is likely to have a serious impact on
pension coverage of American workers in the future as even lower-
paid service jobs substitute for the jobs lost."' The overall pattern,
however, is clear-at least part of the reason for the decline in pension
coverage is the change in the pattern of employment itself. I venture
to suggest that this is not a "natural" evolution, but rather a strategic
response. As workers came to demand and expect benefits in the
post-World War II era, employers began to explore avenues for avoid-
ing those demands, and the changing patterns we see are at least in
part a result of employer efforts to undermine the benefit structure
previously established, in order to reduce costs and limit employee
bargaining ability.
3. ECONOMIC SEGREGATION OF EXISTING PENSION
ARRANGEMENTS
The structure of labor and employment relationships has
changed greatly over the last forty years, leading to less employer in-
terest in the pension function of employee retention, and less em-
ployee interest in pension arrangements predicated on long-term em-
ployment with one employer.52 Defined benefit plans, in particular,
are far less likely to be adopted by employers, and the employers who
already have such plans have been attempting to reduce their liabili-
ties under them without actual termination. 3 Because the defined
benefit plan requires an employer to promise a specific level of bene-
fits and fund those benefits for the life of the covered employee, de-
fined benefit liabilities are unpredictable in amount and stretch far
into the future.5" As a result, creative arrangements have been de-
51. For the GAO's most recent examination of outsourcing's effects on the
U.S. economy see GOV'T ACCOUNTABILIrY OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
CURRENT GOVERNMENT DATA PROVIDE LIMITED INSIGHT INTO OFFSHORING OF
SERVICES, GAO-04-932 (2004); Joseph R. Meisenheimer II, The Services Industry in
the 'Good' Verses 'Bad' jobs Debate, 1998 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 22, available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mr/1998/O2/art3full.pdf (discussing evidence dem-
onstrating that service jobs are not necessarily worse than manufacturing jobs and
analyzing the shift from manufacturing to service jobs through the lens of relative
job quality); see, e.g., John Cassidy, Winners and Losers; The Truth About Free Trade,
NEW YORKER, Aug. 2, 2004, at 26; Lou Dobbs, Is Outsourcing Killing Jobs?,
OPTIMIZE, Sept. 1, 2004, at 19; Daniel W. Dvezner, The Outsourcing Bogeyman,
FOREIGN AFF. 22 (2004). But cf. Joellen Perry et al., Made in America, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 17, 2004, at 50 (discussing three firms who intentionally main-
tain their businesses in the United States rather than overseas outsourcing).
52. See generally Wolff, supra note 28.
53. See Munnell et al., supra note 3, at 10.
54. Id. at 6.
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signed to increase benefits for the highly paid and reduce pension
commitments for most other workers.
An example of how employers satisfy the latter goal is the inven-
tion and adoption of the "cash balance plan,""5 which enables em-
ployers to reduce pension liabilities and future benefits under existing
defined benefit plans.' The former goal is met through adoption of
nonqualified executive compensation plans for their highest paid em-
ployees who can, as a result, be excluded from the rank and file's pen-
sion arrangements, which can then be greatly reduced or eliminated.57
Taken together, these devices are pushing existing pension ar-
rangements back into a segregated world in which highly paid work-
ers receive generous retirement income plans while lower-paid work-
ers are left with little or no coverage, 8 something that ERISA and the
tax qualification rules in effect for pension trusts since the late 1930s
were intended to prevent.5 9 Instead of one big tent for all employees,
we are now seeing an army of smaller tents-large, roomy ones for
the highly paid, and virtual pup tents for the rank and file.
In the mid-1980s, pension consultants devised a new type of re-
placement for defined benefit plans to meet the requests of their em-
ployer clients who were locked into long-term defined benefit plan
55. See Zelinsky, supra note 45, at 685; see also Regina Jefferson, Striking a Bal-
ance in the Cash Balance Plan Debate, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 513, 514 (2001).
56. See Zelinsky, supra note 45, at 685-86.
57. Halperin, supra note 45, at 23-24.
Under a nonqualified plan, if no special funding occurs, the em-
ployee's tax is deferred until payment is received, as is the employer's
deduction. As a result, investment income is effectively taxed at the
employer's rate, which should be close to the employee's. Thus, while
shifting to a nonqualified plan loses the tax advantage of tax-free in-
vestment income (unless the employer is tax-exempt or has otherwise
unusable tax deductions), the tax result as to investment income is
still comparable to the result under current compensation.... [11n or-
der to achieve the tax treatment just described, payment must depend
upon the continued solvency of the employer. Thus, nonqualified de-
ferred compensation may be less secure than individual savings. Fur-ther, unlike funded nonqualified plans, such unfunded arrangements
must be linited to a select group of management or highly compen-
sated employees, which apparently does not include all employees
who are deemed highly compensated under the Code.
Id. The tax rules governing nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements,
most of which involve what are popularly known as "rabbi trusts" are contained
in Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985); Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B.
422; Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
58. Halperin, supra note 45, at 24.
59. Id.
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liabilities.60 These employers wanted to reduce costs associated with
those liabilities without actually terminating plans, which would re-
quire full funding of currently promised benefits.6 1 Cash balance
plans, first devised in the mid-1980s, were designed to reduce prom-
ised future payments under a defined benefit plan, thus achieving re-
duced pension obligations for the employer, while convincing
younger workers that they are better off with a cash account balance
than with a traditional defined benefit plan.62 Older workers have by
and large not bought into this message, but their efforts to attack cash
balance plans as discriminatory against them, or as violating ERISA's
rules against reducing already accrued benefits, have met with limited
success.
63
Employers have also used creative ways to devise executive
compensation arrangements that satisfy the most highly paid employ-
ees' desire to defer large portions of their salary for tax purposes, far
in excess of what would be allowed under the qualified plan rules ap-
plicable to both DC and DB plans.' 4 These arrangements are nomi-
60. See Jefferson, supra note 55, at 522.
61. Id. at 522-23. See generally Zelinsky, supra note 45.
62. See Jefferson, supra note 55, at 543.
63. Under the minimum vesting rules, accrued benefits cannot be reduced by
an amendment to the plan. I.R.C. § 411(d)(6) (2004). Under ERISA's benefit ac-
crual requirements, an employee's accrued benefits cannot be reduced because of a
plan amendment. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (2004). ERISA also contains an age discrimi-
nation provision which prohibits the reduction in an employee's benefit accrual
rate or the cessation of benefit accrual. Id. § 1054(b)(1)(H). In Campbell v. BankBos-
ton, the First Circuit held that by switching from a defined benefit plan to a cash
balance plan, the switch only resulted in a reduction in expected benefits not ac-
crued benefits. Since the reduction was only in expected and not accrued benefits,
the switch did not violate 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) according to the First Circuit. Camp-
bell v. BankBoston, 327 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2003). In Eaton v. Onan Corp., the district
court held that cash balance plans are not illegal as a matter of law and do not vio-
late 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H). Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815 (S.D.
Ind. 2000). The district court found that the age-discrimination provisions of the
ADEA and ERISA do not apply to anyone who has not reached the normal retire-
ment age. Id. The court went on to say that even if the pension age discrimination
provisions applied to all participants, the cash balance plan would not violate
these provisions because the cash balance plan's rate of accrual does not depend
on age. Id. at 816.
64. For a plan to qualify, the limits on the annual benefits in a defined benefit
plan are expressed as the lesser of $160,000 or the average compensation for the
employee participant's three highest years of compensation. I.R.C. § 415(b)(1). For
a defined contribution plan, the limit for acceptable employer contributions is the
lesser of $40,000 or 100% of the employee's compensation. Id. § 415(c)(1). For a
plan to be qualified, the contributions or benefits cannot discriminate in favor of
the highly compensated employees (as defined in §414(q)). Id. §401(a)(4).
Whether or not the contributions or benefits discriminate in favor of the highly
compensated employees depends on the form of the plan and its effect in opera-
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nally "unsecured," meaning the employer has only a contractual obli-
gation to pay the amounts deferred under the plan at some point in
the future, which allows the employee to delay taking the amounts
deferred into income until he actually withdraws the cash in the fu-
ture.'
In fact, however, executives are virtually assured of receiving
this deferred compensation, either because they control the employing
company's financial operations, or because they have insured the ar-
rangements through a third-party insurer.' This advantageous
tion. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(4)-l(a) (1993). The § 401(a)(4) regulations set out the ex-
clusive rules for determining whether or not a plan satisfies the nondiscrimination
requirement of § 401(a)(4). Id. Whether or not a defined contribution plan is non-
discriminatory in amount is analyzed under § 1.401(a)(4)-2. Id. § 1.401(a)(4)-
1(b)(2)(ii). Whether or not a defined benefit plan satisfies the nondiscrimination
requirement is analyzed under § 1.401(a)(4)-3. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-1(b)(2)(iii)
(as amended in 1993). These regulations also say that a plan must not only satisfy
§ 404(a)(4), but must also satisfy the requirements of § 410(b). Id. § 1.401(a)(4)-
1(c)(4)(i). Section 410(b) contains the minimum coverage requirements for a quali-
fied plan. I.R.C. § 410(b). For a plan to satisfy the minimum coverage require-
ments of § 410(b), the plan must either cover a percentage of the nonhighly com-
pensated employees which is at least seventy percent of the percent of covered
highly compensated employees or meet the average benefit percentage test. Id.
65. While the doctrine of constructive receipt, see Minor v. United States, 772
F.2d 1472, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1985), potentially applies to rabbi trusts, the Service
has repeatedly ruled that the creation and funding of a correctly structured rabbi
trust will not cause inclusion in the beneficiary's gross income until actually dis-
tributed. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 178 (In which the Service stated
that the doctrine of constructive receipt is to be used sparingly and its application
in the deferred compensation context is to be made on the specific factual situa-
tion.); Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422 (In which the Service provided a safe-
harbor model rabbi trust that if the employer follows its terms, neither the con-
structive receipt doctrine nor the economic benefit doctrine will apply to the em-
ployee solely because of the adoption and maintenance of the rabbi trust.); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 81-12-107 (Dec. 31, 1980) (Original rabbi trust ruling where IRS ruled that
the constructive receipt doctrine does not apply to the funding of the trust since
substantial limitations or restrictions were placed on receipt. The Service found
the fact that the trust amounts could be reached by the employer's creditors and
that since the amounts were not actually paid or made available to the employee
were substantial enough restrictions to only cause inclusion in the employee's
gross income when actually paid or made available.); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39, 230
(May 7, 1984) (In which the Service concluded that the payment of funds into a
rabbi trust would not be included in the employee's gross income until actually
distributed and that the constructive receipt doctrine would not apply to cause in-
clusion in gross income.).
66. See, e.g., Priv. Let. Rul. 83-29-070 (Apr. 21, 1983) (In which the Service al-
lowed the employer to purchase a single premium deferred annuity policy on the
lives of the employee and his spouse to fund the rabbi trust without causing inclu-
sion in the employee's gross income at the time of purchase and contribution to
the trust.); Priv. Let. Rul. 9344-038 (Aug. 2, 1993) (A rabbi trust benefici-
ary/employee purchased insurance against potential unpaid deferred compensa-
tion. Then the employer increased the employee's compensation by the amount of
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treatment for executives enables the employer to essentially leave
them out of qualified plans applicable to all other employees, thus re-
ducing any pressure to keep benefits generous for workers at all wage
levels. If taken to the extreme, employers are able to set up nonquali-
fled deferred arrangements for the highest paid workers and provide
little or nothing in the way of pension benefits for the rest of their em-
ployees.
The ability of highly paid executives to opt out of the qualified
retirement plan structure applicable to rank and file employees has a
corrosive effect on the retirement plans available to most employees.
The retirement of the baby boom generation is clearly endangered by
the weaknesses in the private pension system that have been exacer-
bated by the ability of executives to provide for themselves while
leaving their employees inadequately prepared for retirement.
4. IMPACT OF LEGISLATION-DESTROYING THE VILLAGE IN ORDER
TO SAVE IT
As American workers have continued to lose pension coverage,
it might be reasonable to expect Congress and the executive branch to
respond in ways designed to increase or at least stabilize pension cov-
erage, if a stable retirement expectation was accepted as a social good
and a national goal. However, over the last decade, the actions of
Congress in particular appear to be designed, at best, to do nothing to
stop the weakening of the private pension system, and at worst, to ac-
tively encourage its demise.
A prime example of congressional failure to stop or at least slow
down the disintegration of the traditional pension structure is the leg-
islation introduced and reintroduced over the last several years by
Representatives Portman and Cardin, known in the pension press as
"Portman-Cardin."67 While the bill's proponents assert that their ef-
premiums to be paid by the employee. This increase in compensation would be
included in the employee's gross income under § 61(a)(1). The Service ruled the
issuance of the policy to the employee would not cause the deferred compensation
amount to be included in the employee's gross income until actually paid to the
employee.); Michael G. Goldstein, The Uses of Insurance in Non-Qualified Deferred
Compensation Planning, SC35 A.L.I-A.B.A. Continuing Legal Education Course of
Study Materials 363 (1998). New §409A of the Code enacted as part of the Ameri-
can Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 885 (2004), is intended to
restrict the use of nonqualified arrangements to avoid current taxation of effec-
tively secured deferred compensation. Time will tell if the new law actually has
that effect.
67. See Campaigning on Social Security, supra note 19.
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forts are designed to help American workers provide for their retire-
ment, and preserve the private pension system, most of the bill's pro-
visions would in fact do substantially the opposite.
For example, one of the costliest provisions in the bill would
weaken the current "minimum distribution" rules, at a cost of $24 bil-
lion over the next ten years and more than $4 billion in 2013 alone.68
The current law minimum distribution rules are designed to ensure
that private pensions and tax-favored retirement savings are used for
consumption needs in retirement, rather than for building an estate to
be passed along to heirs.69 Since one of the main reasons for the tax
advantages extended to pensions and retirement savings arrange-
ments is to encourage saving for retirement,' it is only appropriate
that the tax rules encourage use of those tax-advantaged savings for
that purpose. Thus, most types of pension arrangements, as well as
individual arrangements such as IRAs, require that distributions out
of the tax-exempt trust begin no later than age 70.5.71
The Portman-Cardin bill would substantially undermine this
purpose by raising the age for required minimum distributions to
seventy-five.72 On the surface, this proposal could be argued to be a
68. Section 401(a)(9) requires the employee's entire interest be distributed ei-
ther no later than the required distribution date or, beginning on the required be-
ginning date, distributed ratably over the remaining life of the employee and the
designated beneficiary in accordance with the regulations. I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(A).
The required beginning date is April 1 of the calendar year, which is the later of
either the employee attaining the age 70.5 or retiring. I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(C)(i). The
Portman-Cardin legislation would increase the required age for distributions to
seventy-five by the year 2010; while changing April 1 to December 31 and stating
that an employee who retires in December is considered to retire in the next calen-
dar year. Pension Preservation and Savings Expansion Act of 2003, H.R. 1776,
108th Cong. § 201(a), (b) (2003).
69. For a clear statement of these current law purposes, see Jay A. Soled &
Bruce A. Wolk, The Minimum Distribution Rules and Their Critical Role in Controlling
the Flood Gates of Qualified Plan Wealth, BYU L. REV. 587, 616 (2000); see also Mark J.
Warshawsky, Further Reform of Minimum Distribution Requirements for Retirement
Plans, TAx NOTES, Apr. 9, 2001, at 297.
70. Warshawsky, supra note 69, at 297 ("The public policy purpose of the
minimum distribution requirements.. . is to ensure that tax-qualified retirement
plans serve primarily as vehicles for providing income during the retirement of the
plan participant and his or her spouse.").
71. I.R.C. § 401(a)(9). The regulations provide detailed requirements for
meeting the requirements of § 401(a)(9). 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)( 9)-l (2003). The re-
quired distribution rules for a defined contribution plan are contained in
§ 1.401(a)(9)-5. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(9)-5. The required minimum distribution rules
for a defined benefit plan are contained in § 1.401(a)(9)-6. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(9)-6.
72. Pension Preservation and Savings Expansion Act of 2003, H.R. 1776, 108th
Cong. § 201(a)(2) (2003).
NUMBER 2
266 The Elder Law Journal
response to lengthening life-spans, allowing workers to retain their
accumulated equity in a tax free trust for a longer period of time and
thus helping to ensure that their reserves are sufficient to last their en-
tire lifetime. The reality, however, is somewhat less benign.
Only those who have sufficient other means to maintain them-
selves in retirement, and who wish to preserve their tax-favored sav-
ings as part of their overall estate planning, would actually benefit
from such a delay in required distributions. Lower-income Ameri-
cans, in contrast, continue to retire long before age seventy-five and
need to begin withdrawals from whatever retirement savings they
have in order to meet everyday household needs. Moreover, allowing
a delay in distributions would, in effect, give more years of tax-free
build-up in account balances, thus reducing the ultimate effective tax
rate on those accounts.73 Thus, a provision nominally neutral in de-
sign has a strong bias in favor of higher-income workers and retirees.
Another provision of the Portman-Cardin legislation would al-
low tax-free withdrawals from retirement accounts, up to $2000 per
year for the first five years, as long as the withdrawals take the form
of a lifetime annuity.74 "The legislation would phase this tax-free
preference out for couples with incomes above $120,000."' 7 On its
face, this provision appears designed to encourage withdrawals from
retirement accounts in the form of monthly benefits, better designed
to provide for recurring living expenses and more likely than a lump-
sum withdrawal to last until the end of the retiree's life.
The problem with exempting annuity payments from tax is that
the amounts in the account have already been greatly tax advan-
taged-the contributions to the account were either made on behalf of
the employee and thus were not taxed to her, or were deductible by
her, if the account is a traditional IRA.76 Furthermore, the earnings on
73. See PETER R. ORSZAG & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORmES, THE WAYS & MEANS COMMITTEE PENSION TAX-CUT LEGISLATION:
UNSOUND POLICY THAT DIGS THE NATION'S FISCAL HOLE DEEPER (2003).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Under a § 401(k) plan, the employer gives the employee the election of
whether to receive an amount in cash or have it contributed to the plan on behalf
of the employee. LR.C. § 401(k)(2). Even though the employee has the election to
receive the contributed amount in cash, this option will not cause the contributed
amount to be considered "distributed or made available" to the employee. Id.
§ 402(e)(3). The employer is then able to deduct the contributed amount in the
year when paid, so long as the total amount of contributions do not exceed twenty-
five percent of the covered employees' total compensation. Id. § 404(a)(3)(A)(i).
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the principal deposited in the account would not previously have
been subject to tax under the normal rules of tax treatment of pension
trusts.' Standard principles of good tax policy require that income be
taxed once to the same taxpayer at some point-under this proposal,
pension income received as an annuity under these circumstances (but
not others) would not be taxed at all.
My main concern here, however, is not tax policy so much as it is
retirement policy. The distributional effects of both of these provi-
sions are clear-higher-income taxpayers would benefit much more
than lower-income taxpayers who, by definition, benefit much less
from tax exclusions. One analysis estimates that two-thirds of the eld-
erly would save at most $300 a year in taxes.7" Not only would this
provision do little to encourage retirees to take distributions from re-
tirement savings accounts as annuities, it would most benefit those
who least need it-the upper one-third in income.
This kind of provision is a clear example of favoring the well-off
through the use of ostensibly neutral tax provisions. The rest of the
Portman-Cardin Bill contains provisions similarly designed to provide
additional tax benefits to higher-income workers. For example, the
bill would accelerate the schedule that was enacted as part of the Eco-
nomic Growth and Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2001 for fu-
ture increases in the yearly amounts employees are allowed to con-
tribute on a tax-favored basis to a § 401(k) plan.79 While higher-
income workers with sufficient excess income to finance additional
contributions will benefit from the higher contribution limits, it seems
unlikely that lower- to middle-income workers will ever see any ex-
pansion of their opportunity to retire based on such changes.
Portman-Cardin is one example of the various relatively minor
pieces of legislation proposed or enacted over the last fifteen years
that center on incentives to increase savings rates, and essentially ig-
When an individual makes a contribution to an IRA, the contribution is an above
the line deduction to the individual. Id. § 62(a)(7). This deductible contribution for
2005-2007 is $4000 per year. Id. § 219(b)(5)(A). This deductible contribution
amount increases to $5000 per year for the years 2008-2010 and then reverts back
to $2000 per year beginning in 2011. Id.; Economic Growth and Tax Relief Recon-
ciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901, 105 Stat. 50, 50 (2001). If the con-
tributing employee is fifty or older, then small catch-up contributions are allowed
in addition to the normal deductible amount. I.R.C. § 219(b)(5)(B).
77. See I.R.C. § 62(a)(7).
78. ORSZAG & GREENSTEIN, supra note 73.
79. Pension Preservation and Savings Expansion Act of 2003, H.R. 1776, 108th
Cong. § 402(a) (2003).
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nore the ongoing demise of the defined benefit plan."0 Various types
of individual retirement account rules allowing for early, penalty-free
withdrawals to pay for education or first-home down payments, fur-
ther weaken the already meager retirement income value of IRAs, and
of the lump-sum distributions from other types of pension plans that
are frequently rolled over into IRAs."1
Congress has focused its attention almost solely on measures
advertised as increasing incentives for retirement savings, while doing
nothing to stop the disintegration of the defined benefit pension plan
812system. What, then, does the system of retirement savings plans,
both employer-based and IRAs, contribute to the overall retirement
system for low- and moderate-wage workers? I would argue not
nearly enough.
80. See Retirement Security for All Americans Act, H.R. 5190, 107th Cong. § 2
(2002); Comprehensive Retirement Security and Pension Reform Act of 2001, H.R.
10, 107th Cong. (2001); Comprehensive Retirement Security and Pension Reform
Act, H.R. 4843, 106th Cong. (1999); Retirement Account Portability Act of 1999,
H.R. 739, 106th Cong. (1999); Retirement Security for the 21st Century Act, H.R.
3788, 105th Cong. (1998); Comprehensive Pension and Retirement Security Act of
1997, H.R. 83, 105th Cong. (1997); Retirement Savings and Security Act, S. 1818,
104th Cong., (1996).
81. Under I.R.C. §§ 408 and 219, individual retirement accounts (IRAs) may
receive deductible contributions of funds up to $4000 per year for 2005-2007, and
$5000 for 2008 and afterward; individuals may also roll over unlimited amounts
from qualified plans that are eligible to be distributed to them under I.R.C. § 72
(2000). Account holders may withdraw sums from traditional IRAs prior to re-
tirement under § 408(d) for any reason, and pay a ten-percent penalty as well as
including the amount withdrawn in taxable income. Moreover, changes made in
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 allow account holders to withdraw up to $10,000
for buying a first home with no penalty, id. § 72(t)(2)(F); similarly early, penalty-
free withdrawals are allowed for higher education costs. Id. § 72(t)(2)(E), (F). For
the failure of IRAs to make much difference for low income workers, see Halperin,
supra note 45, at 40:
There are tax incentives for employer-based pension plans and, to a
lesser extent, for Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). In essence,
these arrangements allow assets to grow tax-free while other invest-
ments are subject to tax. Still, many workers have little, if any, private
savings. Given their immediate needs and low tax bracket, even a tax
preference will not sufficiently encourage savings among low-and
moderate-income workers. For example, only a small minority of
households earning less than $25,000 have taken advantage of the op-
portunity to establish an IRA.
Id. For example, in 1995, only fifteen percent of households earning between
$10,000 and $25,000 established an IRA. See Daniel I. Halperin & Alicia H. Mun-
nell, How the Pension System Should be Reformed 54 (Sept. 17, 1999), available at
http: / /www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/es/events/erisa/99papers/erisalO.pdf (last
visited Feb. 10, 2003).
82. There have been no legislative changes to the basic tax treatment of de-
fined benefit plans since the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
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B. False Promises: Employer-Based and Individual Retirement
Savings Plans
The disintegration of the private pension system has received
relatively little public attention, perhaps in part because of the unend-
ing stream of articles and financial advice columns focused on how
people can save and invest for their own retirement. The standard
framing of the issue is that if Social Security will not be there when the
baby boom retires, how can that and later generations invest their way
to a financially secure old age? 3
Leaving aside for the moment the truth of assertions about Social
Security's imminent demise, we need to carefully examine the as-
sumption that individual savings and investment can support retire-
ment for individuals at all levels of income. We also need to examine
what people are thinking of when they talk about their own retire-
ment, and how those images have evolved from genteel poverty in a
mobile home in Florida or Arizona to, perhaps, an unsupportable
level of leisure consumption for a very substantial portion of life.
1. EMPLOYER PROVIDED RETIREMENT SAVINGS
Before examining the prospects for self-financing retirement in
the future, we should look at current patterns of savings, especially
within employer sponsored tax-favored savings plans, like § 401(k)
cash or deferred arrangements (CODAs),' to determine whether all
83. See Dave Barry, Uh-Oh, Silver, It Just Won't Go Away, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(Florida), June 16, 2000, at El; Martin Crutsinger, THE NATION; Fed Chief Urges
Cuts in Retirement Benefits; Alan Greenspan Says Choices Will Be Painful Because the
U.S. Will Be Unable to Provide Levels Received by Parents of Baby Boomers, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2004, at A23; GAO: Fix Needed in Social Security, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
July 30, 2003, at A7; Jeffrey Sheban, Many Save for Retirement; Social Security Viewed
as Weak Link, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Mar. 22, 1996, at iF; Soon to Be Entitled
to Bankruptcy; Entitlement Panel Does the Scary Math, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1994, at
M4; Jonathan Weisman, Fixing Social Security No Longer the Third Rail of U.S. Poli-
tics; Powerful Voting Bloc of Seniors Ready for Reform, Though Wary, THE SUN (Balti-
more), Mar. 1, 1998, at IA.
84. Other employer provided retirement savings devices include I.R.C.
§ 403(b) plans, which allow tax-exempt organizations and public educational or-
ganizations to contribute a portion of an employee's salary to certain custodial ac-
counts or purchase annuities for their employees. Some employers will match a
portion of the employee contributions. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 46, at 223-
24. Another form of employer provided retirement savings is a simplified em-
ployment pension (SEP) under I.R.C. § 408(k), permitting an employer to make
contributions to an IRA established on behalf of an employee in amounts above
the traditional and Roth IRA limits. See I.R.C. §§ 415(c), 219(g)(5)(A). Finally, sim-
ple retirement accounts, under I.R.C. § 408(p), are individual retirement plans
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the current savings incentive provisions are working to boost the re-
tirement income prospects for most American workers. Current pat-
terns are not encouraging.
The overall national savings rate is still at historically low levels,
despite decades of savings incentives in the tax code and constant
nagging from economists and financial experts."' Moreover, the spe-
cial incentives for retirement savings, such as IRAs and § 401(k) plans,
appear to be used primarily by those who need them least.8 6 Recent
studies have found that younger workers are least likely to participate
in § 401(k) plans, as are workers with less than $50,000 per year in
earnings.87 Furthermore, the amounts held in § 401(k) plan accounts
are far too small to provide substantial income in retirement when
converted into a lifetime income stream-according to recent surveys,
the average dollar amount held in a § 401(k) plan is only around
$51,000.88
In addition, the investment patterns for § 401(k) accounts, in
combination with lenient plan rules allowing borrowing against plan
accounts, present serious problems for the argument that individual
accounts offer a viable path for retirement security for middle- to
lower-income workers. The debacle of Enron employees losing their
entire retirement savings because their § 401(k) accounts were in-
vested primarily or wholly in the stock of their bankrupt employer is,
sad to say, not an exceptional case. According to recent surveys, most
companies allow employees to invest their § 401(k) account balances
whereby employees make contributions under a qualified salary reduction ar-
rangement and the employer is required to match the contribution up to a speci-
fied amount. Id. §§ 408(p)(l)-(2).
85. Personal saving, defined as the amount of aggregate disposable personal
income remaining after personal spending on goods and services, has declined to
0.1% of GDP in 2000 and is at its lowest point in over sixty-five years. U. S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL SAVING ANSWERS TO KEY QUESTIONS (GAO-01-
591SP, June 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01591sp.pdf.
86. See Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security Privatiza-
tion, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 65-66 (2004).
87. Id.
88. See SARAH HOLDEN & JACK VANDERHEI, INV. CO. INST. PERSPECTIVE,
401(k) PLAN ASSET ALLOCATION, ACCOUNT BALANCES, AND LOAN ACIVITY IN
2003, at http-//www.ici.org/home/perl(-02.pdf (Aug. 21, 2004). This report also
shows that for plans with fewer participants, the amounts are substantially lower,
ranging from $29,544 for eleven to twenty-five participants, to $33,918 for 251 to
500 participants. Id. Wolff's study further shows that for workers age forty-seven
to sixty-four, median pension wealth (including both defined contribution and de-
fined benefit plans) increased from 1983 to 1998 by only eighteen percent, from
$42,500 to $50,000. See Wolff, supra note 28, at 14.
VOLUME 12
HOPE WE DIE BEFORE WE GET OLD 271
in the employer's stock, and almost ninety percent of those employers
place no limits on the amount of their account balances invested in the
company's stock.89
The importance of diversifying investments is common wisdom
among investment counselors, and the behavior of employees who
put all or most of their retirement funds into their own employers'
stock seems irrational, at best.90 However, employees are frequently
given substantial incentives to put their retirement money where their
paycheck comes from. For example, many companies will offer only
employer stock as an investment option for § 401(k) contributions;
others may match an employee's contribution to the § 401(k) plan but
only in the form of company stock, or offer purchase discounts or
similar incentives to induce the employee to invest her account bal-
ance in her employer's stock.91 One recent estimate is that thirty per-
cent of all § 401(k) account balances are invested in the employer's
own stock.92 In addition, investing in the employer has substantial in-
tangible value to many employees-it expresses faith in one's em-
ployer, and it is probably at least in part a case of investing in "the
devil you know" rather than plunging into the great unknown of the
stock market.93
The experience of the Enron employees, who lost not only their
salaries and benefits such as health insurance, but their retirement
savings as well when the company declared bankruptcy, is likely to be
repeated. 94 Even if the employer merely suffers financial reverses, the
89. See Kaplan, supra note 86, at 71-72. The ICI-EBRI survey found that at the
end of 2003, sixteen percent of 401(k) account balances were invested in company
stock; but in those plans offering company stock as an investment option, twenty-
five to almost twenty-nine percent of account balances were invested in such stock;
see also HOLDEN & VANDERHEI, supra note 88, at 8 fig.5. Because few plans limit
the amount of any individual account that can be invested in the employer's stock
if that option is allowed at all, there are likely still substantial numbers of employ-
ees with most of their portfolios in employer stock.
90. See Arron Lucchetti, Tough Sell: Lighten Up on Employer Stock-Despite the
Scandals, Advisors Have Hard Time Getting Investors to Diversify Their Holdings, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 11, 2003, at Cl; Retirement Risk- A Second Lesson from Enron,
MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB., Jan. 5, 2004 at 12A.
91. See Lucchetti, supra note 90, at C1.
92. See Kaplan, supra note 86, at 71.
93. Id. at 75. For another excellent discussion of the problem, see also Susan
Stabile, Another Look at 401(k) Plan Investments in Employer Securities, 35 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 539 (2002).
94. Even more highly paid Enron employees lost millions in retirement de-
ferred compensation accounts when the company filed for bankruptcy, because
nonqualified plans are by definition unsecured. See Kaplan, supra note 86.
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impact on the value of its stock, and therefore on the employees' re-
tirement accounts, can be devastating; poor stock performance can
have a snowball effect leading to contraction of the business and then
to employee layoffs, putting employees in almost as bad a position as
a bankruptcy would have.9"
Employer-sponsored savings plans are thus likely to be inade-
quate as the principal or only retirement pension vehicle for most em-
ployees because of inadequate account levels accumulated by the time
the employee reaches retirement age. At that point, the other part of
the problem with relying on defined contribution accounts for retire-
ment security emerges-the risk of loss of value is still extremely high,
and now will be borne solely by the retiree at a time when the retiree
is usually not in a position to replace any investment losses through
additional earnings.
During the market boom of the 1990s, many workers were opti-
mistic about the prospect of retiring on the amounts held in their
§ 401(k) plans; stocks were booming, and those increases, combined
with a hot real estate market that greatly increased home values, con-
vinced many middle-income Americans that their retirement was
Enron Corp. retiree Mary Wyatt says she's learned never to say, "It
can't get worse than this." Diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in 1992,
she retired with a medical disability in 1998. Last June, her Braes
Heights home flooded in Tropical Storm Allison. She was forced to
sell the house at a substantial loss. And in December, Enron filed for
bankruptcy. That meant Wyatt, fifty-two, will likely lose $500,000
locked up in a deferred-compensation program. Along with Wyatt,
hundreds of ex-Enron executives, many at retirement age, may have
lost tens of millions of dollars in deferred-salary plans.
Dan Feldstein & Eric Berger, Enron's Retired Get Burned, Too; Deferred Salary Plan
Fizzles, THE HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 16, 2002, at Al.
95. See Kaplan, supra note 86, at 76. Resistance to legislative measures that
would limit investment in employer stock is very strong:
Sens. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) and John Corzine (D-N.J.) have an-
nounced legislation that would limit to twenty percent the investment
an employee can have in any one stock in their individual account
plans [among other limitations] .... The bill would also halve the
employer deduction for matching contributions made in
stock .... PSCA's Ferrigno noted that there would likely be grass-
roots opposition to telling people they cannot buy a certain amount of
company stock with Section 401(k) plan money. ERIC's Ugoretz
agreed, and recalled participant opposition to a 1996 Boxer-sponsored
bill which was very similar to her recent offering. Ugoretz said one
factor is that, for many employees, their own company's stock is that
with which they are most familiar and comfortable.
Kurt Ritterpusch, Retirement Policy: Enron, Enron, Enron: Retirement Issues From
Fallout Expected To Dominate Agenda, BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAmLY, Feb. 12,
2002.
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adequately, indeed generously, funded through their retirement sav-
ings. Unfortunately, as the market downturn took stock prices down
with it, retirees have begun to discover that their retirement is far
from secure.
For example, The New York Times recently reported the story of
Concetta McGrath, age seventy-six, a widow who invested the pro-
ceeds from the sale of her family home in the stock market in 2001, in
the hopes that the gains she expected would generate enough income
to allow her to live comfortably, in combination with her Social Secu-
rity monthly check of $800.96 She invested in a mutual fund, was nei-
ther foolish nor risky nor too concentrated in her investment-
nonetheless, the market downturn caused the fund to lose a third of
its value within a few months.97 Even though Mrs. McGrath took her
money out of the fund before she could lose any more, she had to use
$15,000 for living expenses, leaving only $45,000 invested in bank
stocks for security's sake.98 In August 2004, her account's value was
down to $28,000, and "she worries about outliving her money."99
Mrs. McGrath's story exemplifies the dilemma of basing retire-
ment on accumulated equity, whether in the form of a § 401(k) plan,
built up value in the family home, or other types of savings-no mat-
ter how large the accumulated savings, it is impossible to know
whether they will be enough to last until death. Her attempts to make
a prudent investment were foiled through no fault of her own, but
through the natural workings of the market, which is based on risk,
and results in the rise and fall of value of any given investment. The
actual amount of stocks or property accumulated does not matter;
what matters is the value of what has been accumulated, at the time
the retiree needs to liquidate it to provide funds to live on.
Investors became accustomed, in the 1980s and 1990s, to market
downturns that might be severe in the short term, but that were fol-
lowed by robust growth in the market. In the stock market crash of
1987, for example, the market lost almost thirty percent of its value in
a single two-week period, but regained half of those losses within a
96. See Gretchen Morgenson & Jennifer Bayot, Older Investors More Jittery as
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year.' Succeeding short downturns were followed by rebounds in
prices and further upward growth.' This time, however, the market
has not fully recovered, and analysts do not expect it to for some time.
A recent Employee Benefit Research Institute study found that inves-
tors in their sixties, at or near or in retirement, "are still down 8.7 per-
cent on average in their accounts for the four-year period beginning
December 31, 1999, and lasting through the end of [2003]. Participants
in their sixties with more than thirty years of tenure on the job are
even worse off; their account balances fell 15.5 percent on average
during the period.',
10 2
The stock market has recovered some of the losses suffered dur-
ing the worst downturn in 2001 and 2002-but as of this writing, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average is still below its peak in 2000, and stock
analysts "expect the market to tread water for some time to come,
[and] that stock prices will remain flat for a couple of years even as
earnings rise."" Investors, on the other hand, appear to expect much
greater things-in an August 2004 poll conducted by UBS, eighteen
percent of investors said they expected profits of ten to fifteen percent
over the next year, while another twenty-eight percent expected gains
of five to nine percent."
That last finding explains a great deal about the continued popu-
larity of § 401(k) plans with workers who are at best ill-served by
them. The triumph of hope over experience seems to characterize
many American workers' thinking about how they will be able to re-
tire on the demonstrably inadequate sums held in their plan accounts.
The reality, however, is that the gradual shift from defined benefit
100. During the month of October 1987, the highest recorded close on the Dow
Jones Industrial Average was 2640.99 recorded on October 2, 1987. From that date
the Dow steadily declined until Friday, October 16, 1987, when the Dow Jones
Industrial Average closed at 2246.73. On the following Monday, October 19, 1987,
the Dow opened at 2164.16 and eventually closed the day at 1738.74 recording a
one-day point loss of over nineteen percent. The Dow quickly rebounded and
closed at 2027.85 only two days later on October 21, 1987; however, the Dow did
not close above 2164.16 (the opening price on October 19, 1987) until October 20,
1988 (closing at 2181.19), a full year after the crash on October 19, 1987. Further
the Dow did not close above 2246.73 (the close the day before the crash) until
January 24, 1989, whea the Dow closed at 2256.43. The Dow closed the year in
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plans to defined contribution plans has left American workers drasti-
cally underprepared for retirement, and almost wholly dependent on
future Social Security benefits and personal savings to support them
in old age.
2. WOULD INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS BE ENOUGH?
Of course, workers are not limited to employer-provided savings
plans-Congress has been anxious to use the Internal Revenue Code
(Code) to encourage savings for retirement and other purposes over
the last twenty-five years, and the preferred vehicle for these incen-
tives has been the individual retirement account."°5 However, IRAs
have not proven particularly useful for retirement savings for most
workers, probably partly because of the extremely low limits on how
much can be contributed each year on a deductible basis, but more
likely because low- and middle-income workers are unlikely to have
$3,000 each year in excess income for such contributions.' °6
Interestingly, the concept of IRAs originated in Nixon admini-
stration proposals in 1970 to allow workers other than self-employed
business owners to establish Keogh-type individual deferred savings
arrangements. °7 Thus, IRAs were seen by their proponents as tax-
favored savings opportunities for those without pension coverage,
and by their critics as primarily aiding doctors, lawyers, and other
high-income professionals with enough excess earned income to save
$1500 per year with or without tax incentives.'" As enacted in 1978,
105. I.R.C. § 408 (2003).
106. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 amended
I.R.C. § 408(a)(1) and replaced the $2000 contribution limitation with a reference to
I.R.C. § 219(b)(1)(A). Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 601(b)(1), 115 Stat. 38, 95 (2001). Under I.R.C. § 219(b)(1)(A),
the amount allowable as a deduction, on the qualified retirement contributions of
an individual, is limited to the lesser of the deductible amount or the compensa-
tion includible in the individual's gross income for the taxable year. I.R.C.
§ 219(b)(5) further defines the deductible amount as $3000 for taxable years 2002
through 2004, $4000 for 2005 through 2007, and $5000 for 2008 and thereafter.
Practitioners need to remember that the provisions of the Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act sunset on December 31, 2010, and the prior version of
I.R.C. § 408(a)(1) will then be applied again. Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901(a)-(b), 115 Stat. at 150. For
some realistic examples of how narrow the economic margin is for working class
people, see generally BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT)
GETrING BY IN AMERICA (2001).
107. See Patricia E. Dilley, Hidden in Plain View: The Pension Shield Against Credi-
tors, 74 IND. L.J. 355, 420-21 (1998-99).
108. Id. at 422-23.
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IRAs represented an alternative to employer-provided pension trusts,
one that emphasized individual choice and responsibility for saving
out of the worker's own excess income, an alternative to proposals for
expansion of employer responsibility for funding and paying retire-
ment benefits which formed the basis for ERISA enacted four years
before. 9
A traditional IRA can be distinguished from an unrestricted sav-
ings account in several ways. These distinctions are primarily in-
tended to limit the size of the tax benefit inuring to the taxpayer as a
result of the deferral of taxation on deductible contributions and in-
terest earnings on accumulations in the account. However, the restric-
tions on early withdrawals from the account are not actual restric-
tions, but rather penalty mechanisms that have the effect of requiring
repayment of some or all of the tax subsidy inherent in the deferral of
tax on amounts contributed and held in the IRA. Because there is no
annuity payment requirement, and no actual restrictions that force
payouts only in retirement, IRAs are inadequate as a substitute for
true retirement plans.1 °
The risks inherent in all defined contribution arrangements ad-
here to IRAs as well. Amounts in an IRA trust must be invested in
something associated with some risk in order to earn any substantial
rate of return. Thus, the risks of investment loss and of inability to de-
termine whether the value of the equity held in the IRA will be suffi-
cient to support the worker until death are as applicable to IRAs as
they are to employer-sponsored defined contribution plans such as
§ 401(k) plans. In addition, the ease with which IRAs can be drawn
upon for consumption before retirement, albeit subject to a percentage
penalty and inclusion in taxable income of the amount withdrawn,
make them extremely frail vessels for true retirement income sup-
port.11'
The many recent changes made to traditional IRAs, as well as
the enactment of new "education IRAs" and Roth IRAs, were pro-
moted by claims that such measures would improve the national sav-
ings rate while bolstering American workers' retirement income op-
109. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 46, at 73-83 (citing Michael Gordon's
account of the development of ERISA).
110. See Dilley, supra note 107.
111. See Regina T. Jefferson, A Farewell to Pension Policy: The Impact of Flexible
IRAs on Current Tax Policy, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 1451, 1459-61 (1996).
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tions. 112 However, no evidence supports any real increase in the na-
tional savings rate over the last twenty years, and certainly none con-
nects any improvement to IRAs." 3 The enactment of the Roth IRA,
allowing permanently tax-free build-up of earnings on already taxed
contributions that may subsequently be withdrawn for several pur-
poses after as few as five years, once again reveals Congress's predi-
lection for using tax incentives to improve retirement savings vehicles
for primarily upper-middle-income taxpayers who are more likely to
have substantial retirement income options through their employ-
ers.1
4
112. See JOINT ECON. COMM., U.S. CONG., EXPANDING IRA BENEFITS (Dec. 1997),
available at http:/ /www.house.gov/jec/fiscal/tx-grwth/ira/ira.htm.
Under the current tax code, income used for consumption is taxed
only once, but income used for saving is taxed at least twice. This bias
discourages families from saving for future expenses. It also impedes
economic growth by limiting the amount of domestic resources avail-
able for investment. Eliminating or reducing this bias through en-
hanced saving incentives would make the tax code fairer and more ef-
ficient .... Raising the contribution limit would enhance IRA tax
benefits and the associated saving incentives. This, in turn, would
boost the level of personal saving in the United States.
113. For example, an analysis from the National Center for Policy Analysis,
shows the U.S. savings rate steadily declining: "[T]he personal saving rate in the
United States has fallen from more than 8 percent in the early 1980s to about half
that level today." BRUCE BARTLETr, NAT'L CTR. FOR POL'Y ANALYSIS, THE CAsE
FOR EXPANDED IRAs, BRIEF ANALYSIS NO. 139 (2001), available at http://www.
ncpa.org/ba/ba139.html.
114. The treatment of contributions to Roth IRAs is governed under I.R.C.
§ 408A(c). Under this code section, deductions are not allowed for contributions
made to Roth IRAs and contributions are limited to the maximum contribution
that would be allowed under I.R.C. § 219 for the taxable year over the aggregate
amount of contributions made to all other individual retirement plans maintained
for the individual's benefit, other than Roth IRAs, in the taxable year. I.R.C.
§§ 408A(c)(1)-(2). Additionally, some taxpayers may not be permitted to contrib-
ute to a Roth IRA because their modified adjusted gross incomes exceed the dollar
limits established. Id. §§ 408A(c)(3), 219(g)(2)(B)-(C). Finally, contributions are
still permitted to Roth IRAs after a taxpayer reaches the age of 70.5. Id.
§408A(c)(4). The contributions made to a Roth IRA are coming from a taxpayer's
modified adjusted gross income and these contributions were subject to taxation
even though they were made to a Roth IRA. However, if these contributions were
properly made to a Roth IRA, then they enjoy a tax-free build-up of earnings as
long as the contributions and earnings are distributed in a qualified distribution.
Id. § 408A(d)(1). A qualified distribution generally occurs if the distribution is: (1)
made on or after the date the taxpayer attains the age of 59.5; (2) made to a benefi-
ciary or the individual's estate on or after the individual's death; (3) attributable to
the individual's being disable as defined in I.R.C. § 72(m)(7); or (4) due to a quali-
fied special purpose as defined in I.R.C. § 408A(d)(5). Id. § 408A(d)(2)(A). Never-
theless, a distribution qualifying under the above definition may still be excluded
from the definition of a qualified distribution if a payment or distribution is made
from the Roth IRA within the five-taxable-year period that begins with the first
taxable year the taxpayer made a contribution to the Roth IRA. Id. § 408A(d)(2)(B).
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Finally, the underlying weakness of reliance on even tax-
subsidized individual savings to completely fund retirement for low-
and moderate-income workers is the inability of workers with little or
no marginal income during their working lives to save in any substan-
tial amount. A recent Business Week article puts in perspective the
problem of requiring people to save for their own retirement without
any public redistribution:
Katrina Gill, a thirty-six year-old certified nursing aide, worked in
one of the premiere long-term care facilities near Portland, Ore.
From 10:30 p.m. to 7 a.m., she was on duty alone, performing
three rounds on the dementia ward, where she took care of up to
twenty-eight patients a night for $9.32 an hour. She monitored vi-
tals, turned for bedsores, and changed adult diapers. Last month,
Gill quit and took another job for 68 cents an hour more, bringing
her salary to $14,400 a year. But like so many health-care workers,
she has no health-care benefits from her job. So she and her ga-
rage mechanic husband pay $640 monthly for a policy and have
racked up $160,000 in medical debts from their youngest son
Brandyn's cancer care .... In New York City, Joseph Schiraldi, 41,
guards one of the biggest terrorist targets in the world: the Em-
pire State Building. For eight hours a day, he X-rays packages,
checks visitors' IDs, and patrols the concourse. But on $7.50 an
hour in the priciest city in the U.S., he's a security officer without
security-no pension, no health care, and no paid sick days, typi-
cal for a nonunion guard.
Today more than twenty-eight million people, about a quar-
ter of the workforce between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four,
earn less than $9.04 an hour, which translates into a full-time sal-
ary of $18,800 a year-the income that marks the federal poverty
line for a family of four (table). Any definition of the working
poor, of course, involves some blurry lines. Some, like Gill, who
make just above the $9.04 wage, often bounce around the thresh-
old with their chaotic hours, slippery job security, and tumultuous
lives.... Overall, sixty-three percent of U.S. families below the
federal poverty line have one or more workers, according to the
Census Bureau. They're not just minorities, either; nearly sixty
percent are white. About a fifth of the working poor are foreign-
born, mostly from Mexico. And the majority possess high school
diplomas and even some college....115
Clearly, it is a ludicrous notion that workers like these, at or be-
low the poverty level, and struggling to stay even there, could find
enough surplus income to fully fund even a $3000 per year IRA con-
tribution for their eventual retirement. Moreover, these low-wage
115. See Michelle Conlin & Aaron Bernstein, Working... And Poor, Bus. WK.,
May 31, 2004, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/
104_22/b3885001_m2001.htm.
VOLUME 12
HOPE WE DIE BEFORE WE GET OLD 279
workers make up a fourth of the work force-the working poor are
not an insubstantial fraction at the bottom of the wage ladder. The
call for working people to save for their care in old age is not new-
but, as is discussed below, the historical record reveals no pattern of
ordinary working people without substantial property or status being
able to save their way into retirement at all, let alone at the ages cur-
rently considered reasonable for retirement.
C. Attack on Social Security
Thus far, I have examined the crumbling support for two of the
three legs of the traditional pension model. Private pension plans,
that is, defined benefit annuity plans funded by employers and guar-
anteeing monthly income in retirement, are fading and being replaced
by defined contribution plans, primarily § 401(k) plans that for all
practical purposes are indistinguishable from individual savings
through IRAs, the second leg of that three-legged stool. The third leg
is Social Security, which has withstood years of efforts to seriously
engage the public and policymakers in efforts to "privatize" the sys-
tem. These efforts seem likely to reach a crescendo in 2005 as the Bush
administration has made partial (at least) privatization of Social Secu-
rity its principal domestic priority in its second term.1
6
The crash and subsequent depression of stock prices beginning
in 2000 initially dampened enthusiasm for transforming all or part of
the Social Security system into an individual private account system,
similar to a § 401(k) plan."7 However, the 2004 presidential campaign
prompted new calls for privatization as a way to address the retire-
ment of the baby boom generation and beyond, and to resolve Social
Security's long-term financial shortfalls."8 This is the third prong of
the attack on retirement, although those advocating privatization
maintain that it is a viable way to maintain the retirement option for
all American workers. This claim does not withstand serious scrutiny.
There have been dozens of articles in law reviews and elsewhere
over the last few years addressing the Social Security privatization
116. See Social Security Fear, supra note 14.
117. See Daniel Hager, Think Tanks Wrap-Up, UNITED PRESS INT'L., July 22, 2002.
118. THE PLATFORM COMM., 2004 REPUBuCAN PARTY PLATFORM: A SAFER
WORLD AND A MORE HOPEFUL AMERICA, at http://www.gopconvention.com/
platform/2004platform.pdf.
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debate,119 and there is no need here to revisit the debate in its entirety.
I will focus, instead, on the main characteristics of Social Security that
are most important in extending the opportunity to retire to the major-
ity of American workers, as well as the salient points of the most
popular privatization proposals. An analysis of these proposals dem-
onstrates that it is not just Social Security that is under attack, but re-
tirement itself.
1. SOCIAL SECURITY: THE SOCIAL INSURANCE PRINCIPLE
The popular view of Social Security is that it is a pension plan for
all working Americans, to which they and their employers contribute,
and from which they are entitled to draw the benefits they have paid
for when they reach retirement age, set at sixty-five for full benefits
since the inception of the program but currently rising to age sixty-
seven by 2022.121 In fact, Social Security is quite different from the
private pension model, primarily in ways that allow it to support re-
tirement for workers at all income levels.
119. See Daniel Halperin, The Case Against Privatization, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 75
(2004); Kathryn L. Moore, Partial Privatization of Social Security: Assessing Its Effects
on Women, Minorities, and Lower-Income Workers, 64 MO. L. REV. 341 (2000); Kathryn
L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 131
(1998); Daniel Shaviro, Social Security Privatization and the Fiscal Gap, 65 OHIO ST.
L.J. 95 (2004).
120. See Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and the
Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063,
1130-31 (1997).
The original CES plan contemplated a program in which the benefits
in the future would be completely financed by worker and employer
contributions and earnings thereon, somewhat like a defined benefit
private pension plan in which definite levels of benefits are promised
and financed by sufficient funds that are set aside and invested for
that purpose. However, because benefits would begin to be paid out
to older workers before benefits were fully funded in advance, the
program would inevitably require either advance infusion of general
revenues, representing a "funding" contribution for future benefits, or
reliance on a "pay as you go" financing scheme. The latter course was
chosen.
Id.; see Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 201, 97 Stat. 107,
107-09 (1983). The age for receipt of unreduced Social Security Benefits was
amended in the 1983 Social Security Amendments which provided that the age for
eligibility for full benefits would increase by two months a year for people reach-
ing age sixty-two in 2000-2005; the age is maintained at age sixty-six for people
reaching age sixty-two in 2005-2016, increases by two months a year the retire-
ment age for people reaching age sixty-two in 2017-2022, and then maintains age
sixty-seven for people reaching age sixty-two after 2022. See Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97
Stat. 67 (1983).
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Social Security constitutes, for each person who becomes eligible
for benefits, a direct claim to a portion of the nation's production of
goods and services. This claim takes the form of a stream of income in
retirement, and is cashed in at the point each individual chooses to
stop working once they reach the age, or otherwise satisfy the condi-
tion, of eligibility for benefits. 12' The form of payment obviously re-
sembles the classic life annuity under a defined benefit pension plan,
but there are important differences that further Social Security's pur-
pose in providing a basis for retirement for workers even at low in-
come levels.
For one thing, Social Security's benefit structure is weighted in
favor of lower-earning workers, through the benefit formula; for an-
other, benefits are increased each year through an automatic cost of
living increase." Finally, the initial benefit amount is calculated us-
ing earnings that are indexed to increases in wages, to put them in
current dollars at the point of the worker's retirement, so that the ini-
tial benefit reflects increases in productivity in the economy over the
worker's career. 23 Wage indexing is one of the most significant, yet
121. As I have put it elsewhere, "The current formulation of the Social Security
benefit calculation, based on a wage-indexed earnings record that brings old
wages to current dollar levels at the time the calculation is made, guarantees that
the retired worker's share of GNP in retirement will reflect her income position at
the point immediately before retirement." Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights
Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social Security Privatization, 41 B.C.L. REV. 975,
979 (2000).
122. In general, the primary insurance amount (PIA) an individual can expect
to receive is calculated under 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A) (1994). Using the 2004 bene-
fit formula "bend points" the first ninety percent of the individual's average in-
dexed monthly earnings are included in the PIA up to $612, the next thirty-two
percent of the individual's average indexed monthly earnings are included in the
PIA up to $3689, finally, fifteen percent of the individual's remaining average in-
dexed monthly earnings are included in the PIA. Social Security Online, Benefit
Formula "Bend Points", at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/bendpoints.html
(last visited Oct. 13, 2004). Further, for people drawing benefits from the Social
Security system, the benefits increase automatically as a result of the cost of living
adjustment established in 42 U.S.C. § 415(i). Of course, recent increases in the cost
of Medicare premiums have cancelled out the inflation-proofing value of the cost
of living increases. Leigh Strope, Social Security Checks to Bump Up 2.1% in 2004;
But Rising Medicare Premiums Will Eat into Increase, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at
42.
123. An individual's primary insurance amount (PIA) is calculated based on
the individual's average indexed monthly earnings. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A). The
average indexed monthly earnings of an individual are calculated by using the
formula contained in 42 U.S.C. § 415(b). In general, an individual's thirty-five
highest indexed wage earning years are used to calculate the average indexed
monthly earnings. Indexing prior years wages brings past earnings to near current
wage levels. Social Security Online, Examples of Benefit Calculations for Workers
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least well-known, features of Social Security that underwrites low and
average workers' retirement incomes because it in effect insures those
workers-and the Social Security system as a whole-a fixed share of
the nation's economic growth. Before wage indexing was put in place
in 1977, the thirty years of earnings used to calculate benefits (after
dropping the five years of lowest earnings) included the earliest years
of outdated earnings, which depressed the initial benefit level."
As a result of this benefit structure, Social Security provides a
stable source of income that keeps pace with inflation and thus pro-
tects the beneficiary's spending power throughout retirement. In con-
trast, a private defined benefit pension annuity is usually based on se-
lected highest years of earnings (the highest five, or something
similar), which are not indexed, and very few pensions have anything
like a cost of living increase. As a result, as the typical retiree ages,
her Social Security benefits become a higher and higher percentage of
her total income; in 1996, for persons aged sixty-five to sixty-nine, So-
cial Security comprised less than thirty percent of total income, while
for persons aged seventy-five to seventy-nine, Social Security made
up almost half of total income."2 - These indexing features are of
course much more important to average- and low-wage workers with
fewer alternative sources of retirement income, and are key to the role
Social Security has played in decreasing the poverty rate among the
elderly.
Social Security's financing is also distinctly different from the
funding pattern for private defined benefit pensions, for a number of
reasons. Private pensions are sponsored and funded by a given em-
ployer, for the benefit of that company's employees, and the promised
Attaining Age Sixty-Two in 2004, at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/
nominalEarn.html. The indexing factor results from dividing the average wage
index for the year the individual attains sixty by the average wage index for the
year in question. Id. Once the highest thirty-five indexed wage years are deter-
mined, they are added together and then divided by thirty-five to come up with an
average indexed yearly earnings. Id. These average indexed yearly earnings are
then divided by twelve to finally arrive at the average indexed monthly earnings
which will then be used to calculate the individuals PIA. Id.
124. For some background on the volatility in Social Security benefit levels that
led to wage indexing, see Marilyn Moon, Are Social Security Benefits Too High or Too
Low?, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 62, 62-75 (Eric Kingson & James
Schulz, eds., 1997).
125. See NAT'L BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICARE, INCOME
AND ASSETS OF THE ELDERLY AND NEAR ELDERLY fig.4 (from Social Security Ad-
ministration Office of Research and Statistics) (1999), at http://medicare.
comnission.gov/medicare/dowdall.html.
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benefits must be funded by the individual employer.'26 There is some-
thing of an insurance element in a private pension, because not all
employees will eventually receive benefits, and thus forfeitures of
their accrued but nonvested benefits inure to the benefit of all other
participants in the plan.127 Nonetheless, private pensions are essen-
tially the responsibility of the individual sponsoring employer, and
thus must be funded in advance, under ERISA, to insure ultimate
payment of benefits when employees retire. 128
Social Security, in contrast, spreads the cost of paying individual
benefits across the entire generation of producing workers-resulting
not only in redistribution of income from high-wage to low-wage
workers, but also from the working to the nonworking generation.
Under the "pay as you go" financing structure, current payroll tax
revenues are generally used to pay benefits in current pay status.129
The surpluses the system has generated each year since the late 1980s
are accounted for as reserves in the Social Security trust funds, which
are held in the form of U.S. government bond obligations and consti-
tute a degree of pre-funding of benefit obligations. However, because
benefit obligations are supported by the taxing power of the federal
government, there is no need to require advance funding, as there is
for private pensions.
13°
126. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
COMMIEEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM, IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE PENSIONS (2000), at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d02225.pdf.
127. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, PRIVATE PENSIONS IMPROVING WORKER COVERAGE AND BENEFITS
(2002).
128. See id. at 11 (stating that employers make decisions regarding how pen-
sion benefits will accrue and be distributed, while ERISA sets limits on annual con-
tributions and benefits that qualified retirement plans provide for each partici-
pant).
129. See Barry Bosworth, What Economic Role for the Trust Funds?, in SOCIAL
SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 124, at 156, 162-63.
130. The argument for "pay. as you go" financing is elegantly stated by J.
Douglas Brown, who was a member of President Roosevelt's Committee on Eco-
nomic Security that developed the original Social Security legislation in 1934-35,
and amendments in 1939:
To survive, a sovereign government must depend upon the continu-
ing flow of goods and services from period to period. But unlike the
private individual, its power of taxation is a more effective means of
obtaining the resources it needs than the claims of any [private]
bondholder. Taxation as a source of income can be spread over the
whole range of economic activity and the income it produces. A sov-
ereign government, therefore, does not need to acquire
claims... against future income as does the private individ-
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The Social Security benefit and financing structure have both
come under attack as not sufficiently redistributive, fiscally unsound,
not providing sufficient return on investment, and posing an insur-
mountable financial burden for generations to come.!3 My purpose
here is not to provide a comprehensive answer for these criticisms, as
those are readily available elsewhere. 132 What I want to address here
is why these critiques should be seen not just as questioning Social Se-
curity, but as attacking the extension of retirement itself to middle-
and lower-income workers.
The critiques of Social Security based on its long-term financing
problems generally come back to a criticism of the pay as you go fi-
nancing principle. Critics argue that, like private pension plans, Social
Security's financing should be analyzed as a set of unfunded future
liabilities, in order to correctly state the future burden on taxpayers."
If Social Security were required to finance all benefit obligations in
advance, as if it were a private pension, the future unfunded liabilities
would certainly be staggering in appearance. Moreover, even under
the current financing structure, the system faces exhaustion of accu-
mulated trust funds and about a twenty-five-percent shortfall some-
time in the third quarter of the century, depending on what economic
assumptions are used for the calculation."M
ual .... [T]he OASDI system is not a private insurance enterprise. As
an integral part of the United States government, its claims upon fu-
ture income are made good by the sovereign power of taxation.
J. DOUGLAS BROWN, ESSAYS ON SOCIAL SECURmIY 37-38 (1977).
131. For critiques of Social Security's insufficient income redistribution, see C.
Eugene Steuerle & Jon M. Bakija, How Social Security Redistributes Income, 62 TAx
NOTES 1763, 1764 (1994). For discussion of Social Security's "unfunded liabilities,"
see Howell E. Jackson, Accounting for Social Security and Its Reform, 41 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 59, 101-29 (arguing for an "unfunded liability" analysis of Social Security).
Contra Robert L. Clark, Liabilities, Debts, Revenues, and Expenditures: Accounting for
the Actuarial Balance of Social Security, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 161, 170-71 (arguing
that Jackson's perspective ignores actuarial analysis which is more appropriate for
Social Security).
132. See, e.g., Bosworth, supra note 129, at 156-77; Karen C. Burke & Grayson
M.P. McCouch, Privatizing Social Security: Eight Myths, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 41-81
(1997); Dilley, supra note 121, at 984-1026; Colleen E. Medill, Challenging the Four
"Truths" of Personal Social Security Accounts: Evidence from the World of 401(K) Plans,
81 N.C. L. REv. 901, 974-75; Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Mis-
guided Reform, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 131, 132 (1998); Symposium, Public Policy for Re-
tirement Security in the 21st Century: Assuring the Future of Social Security, 65 O-IIO
ST. L.J. 75 (2004).
133. See generally Jackson, supra note 131.
134. See John W. Snow et al., Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs:
A Summary of the 2004 Annual Reports, Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees,
at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/trsummary.html. The annual cost of
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In posing the financing issue as a crushing financial burden on
future taxpayers, these critics have effectively undermined public and
policymaker confidence in Social Security-but perhaps as impor-
tantly, they have set the stage for questioning the broad-based retire-
ment that Social Security makes possible. If Social Security is "too ex-
pensive," which is what these criticisms add up to, the possible
responses must involve cutting benefits or eliminating the program
altogether-and either of those answers would, of course, affect
lower- and middle-income beneficiaries the most, and inevitably make
retirement difficult or impossible for many of them. 5
Another way to look at the financing issue is to look at the gen-
erational equation. As explored in a later section of this article, his-
torically, the aging who can no longer produce goods and services for
themselves have always relied on their children and grandchildren to
support them; it is in the nature of things that the working must, in
addition to supporting themselves and their children, provide support
for their nonworking parents and grandparents. To some extent, the
argument that Social Security is too expensive can be reduced to a
complaint that there are just going to be too many old people to be
supported in the future at a price the critic is willing to pay.
There is no real question that the American economy can pro-
duce enough goods and services for all its citizens, both working and
nonworking-the question is how those goods and services are to be
distributed. Social Security redistributes income between generations,
and between income classes; therefore, the answer to the financing
problems of the system could involve either increased redistribu-
tion-higher taxes on higher-paid workers, for example--or de-
creased redistribution-lower or complete elimination of benefits.
This is a political and social issue, not an economic one, and the an-
Social Security benefits represents 4.3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) today
and is projected to rise to 6.6% of GDP in 2078. The projected seventy-five-year
actuarial deficit in the combined Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and
Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Funds is 1.89% of taxable payroll, down slightly
from 1.92% in last year's report. The program continues to fail our long-range test
of close actuarial balance by a wide margin. Projected OASDI tax income will
begin to fall short of outlays in 2018 and will be sufficient to finance only 73% of
scheduled annual benefits by 2042, when the combined OASDI trust fund is
projected to be exhausted.
135. See Moon, supra note 124, at 66. Table 4.2 shows that Social Security pro-
vides over eighty percent of income for persons aged sixty-five and over in the
lowest income quintile, and even for the elderly in the fourth highest quintile, So-
cial Security made up over forty-six percent of income. Id.
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swer we devise will directly determine whether retirement continues
to be an option for working- and middle-class Americans.136
The other major criticism voiced about Social Security's financ-
ing and benefit structure is the "bad deal" issue-that is, that the
benefits workers receive in return for their payroll tax contributions
do not constitute a good investment. This is the "rate of return" ar-
gument, which typically maintains that someone could take their pay-
roll taxes, invest them in the stock market, and end up with more ac-
cumulated funds for retirement than they would get in benefits.
137
This argument has been exhaustively dissected elsewhere,1" from
both an economic and a political perspective, and I will not reiterate
those discussions in detail here.
I would note, however, that the idea that Social Security payroll
taxes constitute an "investment" and that expected benefits are the
"return" on that investment, in itself reveals a fundamental misunder-
standing of Social Security and its financing structure. Payroll taxes
are a financing mechanism, not an investment, and the amount of
payroll taxes an individual pays has nothing whatsoever to do with
the amount of benefits received by any beneficiary. 3 9 Benefits are
based on the individual's earnings record, which is quite separate
from the individual's tax payments;" in my view, therefore, the entire
"bad investment" argument is a straw man.
Here, however, I will focus on one other important aspect of the
"better deal" argument that directly relates to the idea of broad-based
retirement as the solution to old-age income support. Whether stated
or not, the underlying assumption of the rate of return argument is
that everyone who is smart enough will be a winner in the long run in
private investments. Of course, it is not enough to say Social Security
gives a bad rate of return on investment-the alternative offered is
some sort of private account system, which intelligent investment can
136. The work of Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen cogently makes
the argument for distribution, not production, as the source of poverty in the mod-
em age. See AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT
AND DEPRIVATION 1-8 (1982).
137. For a recent iteration of this argument, see David C. John, Using Social Se-
curity Personal Retirement Account to Create Family Nest Eggs, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Sept. 10, 2004.
138. See Dilley, supra note 121.
139. The Social Security Act entitles all who meet the eligibility criteria to bene-
fits based on earnings recorded through the payroll tax withholding system. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 413-415 (1994).
140. I.R.C. §§ 3101-3328 (1994).
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turn, in the view of proponents, into an adequate retirement system
for all Americans.
The question that usually goes unanswered, of course, is "what
happens to the ones who lose money?" Since the Enron debacle that
question surfaces more readily in any privatization discussion, but it
deserves more focus in a discussion of why alternatives to social in-
surance are likely to spell the end of retirement as the modem ap-
proach to prevention of poverty in old age.
2. WHY PRIVATE ACCOUNTS?
The drive to privatize Social Security, whether wholly or in part,
has many different versions, but the generic version would allow
workers to divert at least part of their Social Security tax payments
into private accounts, to be invested either under their individual di-
rection, or, more frequently, in some sort of approved arrangement
with one or more investment advising firms.14' One major problem
with privatization, of course, is its effect on the financing of currently
promised Social Security benefits. There is really no way to privatize
the system without one generation paying for retirement twice, once
for Social Security benefits already promised, and again, in advance,
for its own retirement. This double-pay transition poses an almost in-
surmountable issue, as it would require enormous income tax in-
creases to continue financing current benefits.
The more central problem, however, is the nature of the private
account system itself, which raises all of the same issues of insecurity
and risk as current employer-provided savings plans like § 401(k)
plans."4 Individual accounts are assumed to give workers a better re-
turn on investment than their payroll tax contributions to Social Secu-
rity only because of the risk that inevitably accompanies such invest-
ments 43 Yet the precise reason for a social insurance system, which
141. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, STRENGTHENING SOCIAL SECURITY AND
CREATING PERSONAL WEALTH FOR ALL AMERICANS (2001), available at http://
www.ourfuture.org/docUploads/2002031131141023.pdf; see also THE PLATFORM
COMm., supra note 118.
142. See discussion supra notes 86-96.
143. See, e.g., AMERICAN CENTURY INVESTMENTS ASSET ALLOCATION HELPS
BALANCE RISK AND REWARD, at http://www.americancentury-com/workshop/
articles/ asset-allocation.jsp :
Next, consider the various types of investments available to you and
their risks and rewards. Higher risk is associated with the possibility
of higher reward and the inverse also is true. While it may seem at-
tractive to chase the return of the latest hot stock, you're more likely
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developed in the twentieth century after millennia of experience with
individuals' coping with their own old-age income needs through
private savings, is to induce retirement by providing certainty of in-
come until the retiree's death.
The purpose of a retirement system is to ensure that workers can
and will retire, leaving the work force before they are forced to by
physical or mental impairment without being reduced to desperate
privation. Modern public retirement systems should be seen as
mechanisms for maintaining consumption and supporting individual
spending power throughout a working population's lifetime, as well
as stabilizing income levels and preventing large disparities in the
economic condition of the elderly.' The social insurance approach
thus combines retirement provision with social stabilization, and an-
nuities based on a life of work with antipoverty features, in order to
make retirement the default system for income support in old age for
workers at all income levels.
In contrast, a system of private accounts, despite the claims
made for it by its advocates, can only accidentally provide retirement
security, and then only for the fortunate few:
The private account system has a fundamentally different pur-
pose, as well as a different ethos, from that of Social Security. All
of the advantages claimed by the private account system over the
public system derive from individual risk, trading the surety of at
least moderate income that has underwritten the modem institu-
tion of retirement for the possibility of greater wealth in retire-
ment (and in inheritance). Adequate retirement income is as-
sumed as a necessary byproduct of the superior capital
accumulation of the private account system, and the risk of not
having sufficient equity to last until death is deemed worth taking
for the sake of greater potential returns.
14 5
The problem with risky investments, as discussed above in con-
nection with the problems of § 401(k) plans, is that there are always
losers along with the winners. That concept may be a necessary ele-
ment in the capitalist market system, which requires investment risk
to promote capital accumulation and thus further investment and
economic expansion. But risk is not compatible with the retirement
choice, which necessarily involves giving up income-producing activ-
to come out ahead with balanced investments in stocks, bonds and
money markets. For long-term growth, stocks are hard to
beat .... But stocks also carry the highest risk.
144. See BROWN, supra note 130, at 20-24.
145. See Dilley, supra note 121, at 1015.
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ity on the assumption that one's retirement income will be sufficient
to the end of one's life.
The real difference between retirement systems based on social
insurance and retirement systems based on individual savings and in-
vestment is that the former evens out the income distribution, while
the latter accentuates the differences between the poor and the rich in
old age:
Unless one disagrees with Alan Greenspan's assessment that the
cyclical nature of capitalism has not been repealed, the same risks
of loss and failure of private equity that overwhelmed private re-
sources during the Great Depression will continue to apply to a
private account system.... In addition, while the stock market
can affect the distribution of wealth between winners and losers,
it does not, over the long run, itself create real economic wealth.
In general the market can be expected to keep pace with national
economic growth, just as indexed Social Security benefits
do .... Thus, while a system of private accounts is likely to pro-
duce some differences in the distribution of wealth between win-
ners and losers, there is no reason to expect a higher level of in-
come for everyone when compared with payments under Social
Security. 14 6
Private accounts may be wonderful devices for building individual
wealth, but they are not an adequate retirement system for the major-
ity of workers, particularly those at low- and middle-income levels
who have much less margin for error and bad luck in investment.
Recent studies have revealed that, in the end, even those with
decent luck in their investment experience may not do better with pri-
vate accounts than they would under the current Social Security sys-
tem because of the costs associated with investment management.
Advocates for private accounts tend to downplay both the transition
costs, discussed above, and the transaction costs of running such a
system.147 However, almost all of the most likely versions of a privat-
ized Social Security system include mechanisms to moderate the risk
of individual investors by having the investments managed by profes-
sional investment firms, through one sort of mutual fund or an-
other."4 The tradeoff for this lessening of risk, of course, is the lower-
146. Id. at 1016.
147. See generally Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Privatizing Social Security at Home and
Abroad, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 368, 370 (1996); Schieber & Shoven, supra note 13, at
376; Lewis D. Solomon & Geoffrey A. Barrow, National Issues: Privatization of Social
Security: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 23 (1995).
148. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 141.
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ing of the possible upside of return on investment, as well as the cost
of management itself.
This cost is not highlighted in general, either by advocates of
privatization or by investment firms themselves. But the administra-
tive costs for a private investment system would clearly be much
higher than the costs of administering the Social Security system,
which is about one-half of one percent of the total outlay in benefits
each year.49 This figure covers salaries of Social Security Administra-
tion employees, maintenance of field offices, computer systems, and
other costs."s Moreover, because management and investment of the
trust funds generally require little activity beyond purchase and sale
of government bonds, the investment costs of the public system are
minimal. 5'
The same cannot be said for the administrative costs of personal
accounts, which could amount to as much as ten to twenty-five per-
cent of the amounts deposited in fees paid to investment advisors,
stock brokers, and various types of investment and transaction fees.
A recent study which analyzed one privatization proposal from Presi-
dent Bush's Commission on Social Security concludes that the ex-
penses that would be paid to investment managers would be equal to
more than twenty-five percent of the existing deficit in Social Security,
and equal to the amount of savings that would be realized by raising
the retirement age by six months."5 2
Transferring even a part of Social Security payroll tax revenues to
private accounts would "be the largest windfall gain [to invest-
ment managers] in American financial history. The $940 billion
149. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 58 (2003), available at http://www.ssa.gov./finance/2003/
FY03_PAR.pdf.
150. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., THE FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET PRESS RELEASE (Feb.
2, 2004), available at http://www.ssa.gov/budget/2005bud.html.
151. In 2003, the administrative costs for the Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance
Programs were $2.6 billion, compared to benefit payments of $400 billion-about
0.5% of outlays. See 2004 Trustees' Trust Fund Financial Operations in 2003
tbl.II.B.1., available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR04/IHcyoper.html#wp
94983. Interestingly, the administrative costs for the Disability Insurance program,
which requires substantive individual determinations of eligibility for benefits
through a state-federal partnership arrangement, cost $2 billion to administer for
$70.9 billion in benefits. Id. This comparison demonstrates the administrative effi-
ciency of the retirement entitlement program that requires no income or other type
of eligibility investigation.
152. Austan Goolsbee, The Fees of Private Accounts and the Impact of Social Secu-
rity Privatization on Financial Managers, Sept. 2004 (on file with The Elder Law Jour-
nal).
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payment to financial companies would be an increase more than
eight times larger than the decrease in revenue from the 2000-
2002 collapse of the [stock market] bubble .... For a worker at the
average income level, the higher fees in privately managed ac-
counts are likely to reduce the retirement value of their individual
accounts by twenty percent.... "153
The attraction of private accounts to many Americans is undeni-
able, particularly to younger workers who have been convinced that
Social Security will not be available to them when they retire. When
the particulars of the private account alternative are examined, how-
ever, it seems clear that the advantages are more imagined than real
for most workers, particularly those with lower incomes and accumu-
lated wealth, and thus lower margin for error.
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF IDEOLOGY
The power of marketing and imagery in the campaign for priva-
tization cannot be underestimated. The campaign against a truly se-
cure retirement grounded in private pension annuities, Social Security
benefits, and private savings has been accompanied by an aggressive
advertising blitz by investment advisors aimed at convincing Ameri-
cans that surrendering their retirement system to private experts will
insure a halcyon old age."M It is remarkable that those most nega-
tively affected by this trend away from redistribution and toward in-
dividually financed old-age poverty have somehow been convinced
that this change is in their own best interests. 55 This ideological cam-
paign has succeeded in making acceptable the increasing disparity in
wealth distribution in the United States, recently demonstrated by
U.S. Census data as substantially more unequal in 2000 than in 1973.156
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Brooke Southall, Schwab Employing Snob Appeal in Ads Courting
Affluent Investors; Firm Wants Bigger Piece of 401(k) Pie, INVESTMENT NEWS, Jan. 19,
2004.
155. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES-INCOME EQUALITY,
TABLE IE-3, HOUSEHOLD SHARES OF AGGREGATE INCOME BY FIFTHS OF THE INCOME
DISTRIBUTION: 1967 to 2001, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/
histinc/ie3.html.
156. In 1973, the households which made up the bottom forty percent of the
share of aggregate income earned approximately 14.7% of the total income, while
households encompassing the top five percent of the share of aggregate income
earned approximately 15.9% of the income. In 2000, the inequality in income rates
had substantially grown with the households which made up the bottom forty
percent of the share of aggregate income earning approximately 12.5% of the total
income, while households encompassing the top five percent of the share of ag-
gregate income earned approximately 22.1% of the total income. Id. Another tell-
ing figure is to examine the mean income received by households adjusted for in-
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With increasing gaps between the wealthy and the poor has come in-
creasing economic insecurity for working-class Americans, yet those
workers are apparently expected to believe that they can save their
way to financial security and a comfortable retirement, all economic
and personal experience to the contrary notwithstanding.157
The public image of retirement, as presented by television, radio
and print ads, is one of prosperous leisure, at the beach preferably,
with the young-looking middle-aged retirees clearly enjoying good
health and no financial problems."s These campaigns are aimed at
luring private investors with sufficient means to justify the fees of the
investment firms sponsoring the advertising, but they reinforce the
public perception that controlling one's own investments for retire-
ment (with the wise advice of investment firms as a guide) will lead to
a sort of "retirement heaven" for everyone.
However, there is a more insidious message embedded in these
optimistic predictions that working people can save enough to finance
a comfortable, and even early, retirement. What if investments do not
produce enough income? What if there are family emergencies (for
example, catastrophic health issues or layoffs) that prevent sufficient
savings? The not particularly subtle subtext of the private savings ar-
gument is that if you arrive at retirement without sufficient income or
assets, it must be your fault-you have been improvident, careless,
lazy, or not quite clever enough in your investment strategy.
All of these factors are really "risks" that are insured against un-
der the insurance model, whether for private pensions or for Social
Security. For those advocating individual savings as an adequate sub-
stitute for employer-provided pensions, however, they are something
akin to moral failings, and those who exhibit such failings perhaps de-
flation. From 1973 until 2000, the mean income received by households in the bot-
tom forty percent increased by approximately twenty-five percent while the mean
income received by households in the top five percent nearly doubled. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES-HOUSEHOLDS, TABLE H-3, MEAN
INCOME RECEIVED BY EACH FIFTH AND TOP 5 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS (ALL
RACES): 1967 to 2001, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/
h03.html.
157. See, e.g., Southall, supra note 154.
158. For example, Charles Schwab Corp. has focused its 2004 ad campaign,
"This is where we come in," more towards retirement investine and 401(k) busi-
ness. Id. Additionallv, other financial services firms, including Fidelity, Merrill
and TD Waterhouse have launched services and ad camvaians aimed at managing
retirement accounts. Ruth Simon. Wall Street Targets Retiring Boomers-Fidelitu.
Merril. Others Launch Services Aimed at Managing Funds Rolled Over from 401(k)s,
WALL ST. J., July 14, 2004, at Dl.
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serve charity but nothing more-an approach much closer to the four-
teenth century's way of aging than its advocates would care to admit.
D. Prospects for Retirement: Brave New World or Impoverished
Old One?
The current structure that has supported retirement in America
for seventy years is clearly weaker than it has been at any time since
the Great Depression of the 1930s."s9 Far from crumbling under its
own weight, as privatization and other advocates for individual sav-
ings systems would argue,"6° it is clear that the various elements of the
system are under deliberate attack. 6 ' Employers have revolted
against bearing the costs of retirement systems, and making the long-
term comnitment to the traditional defined benefit pension. Conser-
vative economists and politicians have mounted a determined cam-
paign against redistribution through the public retirement system and
have for three decades worn away public confidence in the idea of so-
cial insurance.
These advocates argue that a retirement system based on indi-
vidual savings and investment is preferable for most workers to the
current one, primarily because of the looming cost of maintaining re-
tirement for the larger future aging population. 62 The problem of
supporting the aging baby boom is presented as an unprecedented
burden, one that can only be addressed by an "every man for himself"
approach. The generally unstated assumption of this approach is that
those who lose in the market, who do not manage to save enough for
their old age, will constitute a small minority, and will be forced back
onto various systems of public and private charity for maintenance at
some publicly acceptable level of poverty.
This view, I argue, is ahistoric and ignores the experience of gen-
erations in the past who, contrary to popular belief, did have to de-
velop some sort of system for maintaining a significant population of
159. See discussion supra notes 30-114.
160. See, e.g., Kotlikoff, supra note 13.
161. See discussion, supra notes 40-151; see also Social Security Fear, supra note
14. "If the $10 trillion figure [claimed to be the Social Security Shortfall] is essen-
tially bogus, so is the claim that Social Security is in crisis .... In effect, the ad-
ministration's plan would get rid of the financial burden of Social Security by get-
ting rid of Social Security."
162. See Christopher T. Kelley, Uncertainty in the Golden Years: The Growing De-
mands upon the American Retirement Security System, 2 ELDER L.J. 225, 225-27 (1994).
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the old and frail who could no longer work. It also inflates the prob-
lem of supporting the admittedly larger population of elderly ex-
pected in the future by ignoring the dramatic progress in economic
productivity over the last century. We are facing, with the future ag-
ing of the large post-war baby boom generation, not a question of
adequate production of goods and services, but of equitable distribu-
tion of those goods and services, which will almost certainly require
increased redistribution from rich to poor.
In order to fully understand the basis for our current retirement
system, both public and private, and to put the future problems of our
aging population in perspective, it is necessary to look at least briefly
at the history of aging and of human societies' approaches to caring
for the elderly. The truth is that old age is not new; what is different
about the modem era is the development of middle- and lower-class
access to retirement as the way to provide for most people in their old
age.
II. Old-Age Support Versus Retirement Support: The
Historical Record
The ongoing attack on the American way of retirement is justi-
fied by some as necessary to adapt to demographic realities, namely
that people are living longer, we will have far more elderly people
alive in the coming decades than ever before in human history, and
our current retirement system was designed for a population that be-
fore the twentieth century never lived much past age fifty-five or sixty
anyway." 3 But is the modem era so different from the human past?
Have human societies never faced the issue of supporting substantial
numbers of aged people who could no longer work productively?
The answer, according to the historical record, is that of course they
have.
A brief examination of the history of aging and retirement re-
veals that some of the most enduring structures of human social or-
ganization are centered on mechanisms to ensure that the elderly are
taken care of, either through control and inheritance of property, or,
for those without property, through social welfare mechanisms of one
sort or another. The old have always been with us, but retirement and
public pension systems have not. If public and private pension pro-
163. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 46, at 5.
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grams were to be eliminated or greatly diminished in favor of indi-
vidual savings plans of some sort, what kind of world would the eld-
erly face? The past gives some clues for the future.
A. The Premodern Old-Age Experience
Most analyses of retirement in America begin with Chancellor
Bismark's identification in the late 1800s of age sixty-five as the most
appropriate retirement age upon which to base receipt of public pen-
sions.1 6 However, ages between sixty and seventy have apparently
been thought of as the beginning of old age since at least the days of
the Roman Empire and probably before.165 Modern pension analysts
tend to begin our examination of retirement and old-age issues with
the rise of industrialization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries."6 We also tend to assume that old age itself is essentially a mod-
ern phenomenon, and that low life expectancy rates in the pre-
industrial era must have precluded people in earlier eras from worry-
ing about supporting the exceptional few who lived beyond age fifty
or so.
1 6 7
Yet an examination of the historical evidence reveals that even
from the beginning of recorded human history in Mesopotamia, a
substantial portion of the population in every era lived into old age,
and the issue of how the elderly were to live and work was always
present.16 In this section, I will look at the historical evidence about
how past societies have dealt with the fundamental questions that are
at the core of current debates about retirement-how long should
164. See WILLIAM GRAEBNER, A HISTORY OF RETIREMENT 249 (1981). More re-
cent historical works, however, particularly on aging in Europe and Britain, pre-
sent a richer and surely more accurate picture of the demographics and social ex-
perience of aging. See infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
165. See COKAYNE, supra note 9, at 1.
166. See generally DORA L. COSTA, THE EVOLUTION OF RETIREMENT: AN
AMERICAN ECONOMIc HISTORY, 1880-1990 (1998).
167. See, e.g., LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 46, at 5.
Bismarck popularized the notion of age 65 as the appropriate retire-
ment age when he set that age for benefits to commence in the state
pension program he introduced in Germany in 1889. Notice, how-
ever, that age 65 was well beyond the then-normal life expectancy.
Translated to modem life expectancies, Bismarck's plan was roughly
equivalent to a pension program whose benefits would commence
when the participants reached their mid-80s.
Id. As will be seen in the discussion below, the last statement may be a bit off the
mark.
168. See HARRIS, supra note 6.
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humans be expected to work productively, and how should they be
provided for once they can no longer work productively?
Prior to the public redistributional pension systems instituted in
the Western industrialized countries beginning in the late nineteenth
centuries, retirement was available only for the elite. Nonetheless,
some old people of all economic classes have always lived beyond
their ability to support themselves, becoming dependent on others for
care and support until death. Their anxiety about how best to insure
continued control of their resources and maximum independence has
apparently been part of the human condition since ancient times.
1. GROWING OLD IN THE ANCIENT WORLD
It is commonplace for modem analysts to assume that premod-
em humans had extremely short life-spans, and that old age would
therefore have been an extremely unusual experience if not an impos-
sible goal.169 Our knowledge of prehistoric human life-spans and pos-
sible cultural structures for aging care is essentially limited to specula-
tion-but at least as far back as written records can be researched,
family relations and how the elderly should support themselves, or be
supported, were matters of concern. Most importantly for my pur-
pose here, it is possible to see the roots of the strong cultural dynamic
of family organization as a way of caring for the weak-the young
and the old-and as a way for the elderly to control resources to in-
sure their own care until death.
a. Ancient Mesopotamia In ancient Mesopotamia, for example, the
sources are primarily literary and indirect; nonetheless, scholars have
concluded that while chronological age was not important to Mesopo-
tamians, "age-appropriate" behavioral norms can be discerned from
169. I would note that some paleontologists have questioned conclusions about
typical life-spans drawn from analysis of ancient skeletons, asserting that "biases
in the deposition, recovery or aging of skeletons" make drawing conclusions about
average life-spans extremely problematic. Robert McCaa, Calibrating Paleodemo-
graphy: The Uniformitarian Challenge Turned, paper presented at the American Asso-
ciation of Physical Anthropology Annual Meeting, Apr. 2, 1998, at http://
www.hist.umn.edu/-rmccaa/paleo98/indexO.htm. McCaa suggests that our
view that prehistoric and ancient people lived only to their early thirties may be
skewed by problems with the skeletal data itself: "[Tihe constancy of the patterns
[for skeletal data sets] revealed here points to bias as the likely answer-that the
collections are not representative of any once-living population, stable or other-
wise, and that skeletal aging procedures distort true age structures." Id.
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the language itself and from written sources such as the epic Gil-
gamesh. 7 ° These ancient writings reveal the importance ancient peo-
ple placed on having children who would care for their parents in old
age and would carry out required offerings for them after their
death. 171 Such a finding is hardly unexpected-but how many such
elderly parents would have lived long enough to require such care?
Again, demographic data on ancient cultures is in short supply,
but at least in the millennia before the Christian era (B.C.E.), maturity
was thought to have been reached somewhere in the fifties or sixties,
and old age somewhere in the eighties. 72 While we have no way of
estimating how many people reached the age of sixty or beyond in the
biblical era Mediterranean world, there are numerous references in
the surviving literature fragments to aged men as wise counselors
who held political and military offices for life, in a hereditary system.
Other types of ancient sources also support the idea that being "old"
was not exceptional or even highly unusual:
The old appear in numerous work lists throughout Mesopotamian
history. Their participation in the work force not only indicates
that there was not an institutionalized retirement age, but also
may suggest a fear of dependency, although ideally one looked to
sons for support when working was no longer possible .... In the
hierarchy of workers, the head worker was the father; lower ranks
were held by sons in order of seniority.
173
Even though aged men and women probably did not comprise a
large percentage of the population, living beyond one's capacity to
provide for oneself was clearly not uncommon, given the ancient
Mesopotamian practice of "giving" old people, along with others who
could not care for themselves such as children and disabled people, to
the temple, to be cared for by the priests.174 It seems likely that the
older generation used its control over property and resources,
through an inheritance system in which the father retained control
170. See generally HARRIS, supra note 6.
171. Id. at 5-6 ("Descendants vouchsafed support in old age and for a genera-
tion or two the promise of offerings and prayers to the dead, though it is doubtful
whether a long-term cult of dead ancestors existed except for royalty.... The most
horrific of curses was the decimation of descendants so that 'one's brazier was ex-
tinguished'...."); see also id. at 66 ("Poignant is the Old Babylonian letter a woman
sent to her brother in which she says: 'Now I have [acquired and] am raising a
boy, telling myself: Let him grow up, so that there will be somebody to bury
me.').
172. Id. at 28.
173. Id. at 64.
174. Id. at 64-65.
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over land until his death, in order to insure care in old age. In fact,
men appear to have normally married somewhat late in life, in their
midthirties, after the death of their fathers, the point at which they
would come into control of the family property.17
Thus, while perhaps not as frequently as in later times, people
did live into old age even in the preclassical period, and often enough
that their inability to care for themselves gave rise to social structures
like inheritance patterns giving parents control over adult children,
and some form of social welfare that allowed helpless or perhaps im-
poverished elderly to be cared for in religious institutions. Clearly,
the old were expected to work until death if they were able to-there
is no suggestion in the literature that even the elderly were excused
from service because of age alone.
b. Ancient Rome and Greece Somewhat more extensive indications
of how aging individuals fit into society are available for ancient
Greece and Rome; in fact, it is startling to find attitudes and mores in
Roman letters and speeches that would not be out of place in twenty-
first century America.176 The notion of retirement from public life had,
by the time of the Roman Empire, become an accepted course of ac-
tion for men of means and standing who would never have had to
work to support themselves economically even when young." Pliny
the Younger summarized the possible ancient consensus on retire-
ment:
175. Id. at 69-70.
176. For example, "Plato has the elderly Cephalus remark to Socrates: 'Men of
my age flock together and at our meeting the tale of my acquaintance commonly
is, I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled. Some
complain of the slights that are put upon them by relatives, and they will tell you
sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause.' ... Cicero ... believed that [old
men] imagined themselves 'ignored, despised and mocked at'.... COKAYNE, su-
pra note 9, at 79.
177. TIM G. PARKIN, OLD AGE IN THE ROMAN WORLD: A CULTURAL AND SOCIAL
HISTORY 125 (2003).
The only sorts of retirement we tend to hear of are basically voluntary
ones, such as individuals from political life... or the cessation of
campaigning for soldiers. Any other ancient reference to retirement,
if it does not mean a gradual process of withdrawal and cessation of
labor through inability to perform (in which case 'retirement' is a
euphemism), is simply the situation of someone with the required
means choosing to withdraw from earlier activities, or wishing it
could happen.
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This is the right way to grow old for a man who has held the
highest civil offices, commanded armies, and devoted himself en-
tirely to the service of the state for as long as it was proper for him
to do so. For it is our duty to give up our youth and manhood to
our country, but our last years should be our own; this the laws
themselves suggest in permitting the older man to withdraw to
leisure.
78
For ancient Romans, old age appears to have been considered to
begin around age sixty, although there is no indication of categoriza-
tion of those over that age as a specific group with common interests.
Moreover, aging was considered to be a matter of diminishing ability
to function, not of simply reaching an age and being no longer ex-
pected to function." Peasant Romans, far from being able to choose a
"graceful retirement," like Pliny, were apparently, despite aging, ex-
pected to continue to labor as long as they were physically able and
needed earnings to support themselves.8 0
It appears that substantial numbers of ancient Romans lived long
enough for aging to become a public, as well as a private issue. Life
expectancy, once a Roman survived infancy, was not much lower than
it would later be for Europeans and Americans at the turn of the twen-
tieth century.181 Parkin estimates, from a variety of types of evidence,
that at least six to eight percent of the population of the Roman Em-
pire was over age sixty-in contrast, the percentage of those aged
thirty to thirty-four was probably around seven to eight percent at the
178. Id. at 128. Pliny went on to express his hopes for himself: "I wonder
when this will be permitted to me-when shall I reach the aie which will allow me
to follow your noble examle of a zraceful retirement, when my withdrawal will
not be termed laziness but rather a desire for tranquillitas?"
179. Id. at 25.
180. Id. at 224-25 ("The dread of a combination of old age and poverty is one
strongly expressed in the extant literature, even though for [noble and literate]
writers no such combination would have been a realistic prospect... [E]ven
Cicero, in his consolation for old age, has Cato admit.., that... an old age of ex-
treme poverty cannot be tolerable even for a wise man .... But the literary
sources.., fail to furnish us with reliable and realistic depictions of the life of the
elderly poor, despite the fact that we may assume that some 5 to 10 percent of the
overall population of the Roman world at any one time would have been over the
age of 60 years and that the vast majority of them would not have been afflu-
ent.... The poor could of course turn to mendicancy in old age... [as of late in the
fourth century] the only 'legal' sort of beggar came to be one who was old and/or
physically handicapped."); see also COKAYNE, supra note 9, at 6-7 ("[Ancient texts
reveal that a] physically and mentally fit old man was still able to fulfill a useful
function in society and had status and prestige. Only the old who were weak and
decrepit-and who were therefore no longer socially useful-had a marginal
status in society.").
181. See PARKIN, supra note 177, at 124.
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same time.18 2 By way of comparison, about fifteen percent of the
population in the United States is over age sixty-five today, supported
by a vastly more productive and efficient economy. The big differ-
ence in percentages is largely accounted for by differences in birth
rates, not longevity-lower birth rates since the 1970s in the U.S. and
Europe have led to a lower percentage of youth and a higher percent-
age of the elderly in the total population."s
In the ancient world, people seem to have expected to live into
their sixties and many Romans lived into their seventies and eighties,
even though it was probably not the norm."s Still, it must have been a
common enough occurrence for public regulations to excuse men over
age seventy from a variety of public obligations, ranging from physi-
cal labor to local governing obligations."8 5
There was no system of general public pensions in the ancient
world, but as in ancient Mesopotamia, the parent-child compact lasted
throughout life.
The precept of honoring one's parents is an ancient one, common
to most civilizations and to most periods of history. Among the
Romans pietas expressed the virtue very well.... Pietas, it must be
remembered, was a reciprocal arrangement: parents had the duty
of bringing up their children, and the children in return were ex-
pected to repay this 'debt', of both life and nurture, by providing
support for their 6arents when they in their turn were in need-in
their old age .... 1
However, there appears to have been no legal requirement im-
posed upon adult children to support their parents-as in history be-
fore and after the Roman Empire, the older generation controlled fam-
ily property and therefore controlled the condition of its care by the
younger generation.187
182. Id. at 49.
183. Id. at 47-48.
184. Id. at 44.
There is ample historical evidence from the classical period ... of
people surviving into their nineties and bevond .... It is important to
remember that, despite the demographic transition following the in-
dustrial revolution and the advances in medicine in the twentieth cen-
tury. people do not live significantly longer today than they did in the
historical vast. In classical times, dying when one was in one's sixties
or beyond was regarded-at least officially-as natural; to die
younger was usually seen as a harsh and unnatural fate.
185. See generally id. at 93-137 ("[T]he age of 70 years is explicitly stated several
times as excusing the individual from undertaking the burdens of the tutorship
and curatorship.").
186. Id. at 205.
187. Id. at 215.
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The care of older people who had no living children to care for
them, and no property in their control upon which they could depend
for support was apparently not a major subject of public concern.188
The written sources reveal only isolated instances of public support
for certain citizens, such as athletes or military veterans who might be
entitled to land or some type of economic support in old age. 89 The
elderly were entitled to the same public charity as all other Romans-
free grain distributions, for example-but apart from occasional chari-
table bequests for the benefit of those unable to care for themselves
(children and the aged), the elderly poor were forced to rely on the
generosity of friends or frequently a surviving younger spouse for
support.'9° Elderly slaves were cared for by responsible owners, and
abandoned to die by less responsible ones.19'
It seems that while the ancient world had a substantial older
population, there was little or no awareness of any special public wel-
fare need for older people. 92 Older people were expected to continue
in productive work as long as they were able, unless they had the
means to voluntarily retire, an option open only to the wealthy upper
classes. 193 When older persons were no longer able to work or care for
themselves, their children were expected to care for them; those who
had no children were essentially at the mercy of friends or casual
charity.'94 Thus, we see a clear bifurcation in income maintenance of
the elderly-retirement for those with means, work and reliance on
family for everyone else, and haphazard charity for those with neither
wealth nor family.
2. PREMODERN EUROPE-ORIGINS OF WORK-BASED PENSIONS
In the two thousand years since Pliny longed for a quiet retire-
ment from public life, Western society has developed several succes-
sive models for dealing with the elderly, who at all times have com-
prised a more than insignificant portion of the population. A
complete exploration of the treatment of aging up to the changes
wrought by the Industrial Revolution is beyond the scope of this es-
188. Id. at 216-17.
189. Id. at 217.
190. Id. at 218.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 217-18.
193. Id. at 219.
194. See id. at 169, 201, 276.
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say, but a few major approaches are important to note, both for their
consistency and continuity with the ancient world's treatment of the
elderly, and for the evolving notions of social welfare that can be seen
developing even during the middle ages.
First, it is important to note that throughout the medieval period
and into the later premodern period up to the eighteenth century, old
age was considered to begin, as it had been for thousands of years,
some time around the age of sixty.19 The devastation of the Black
Death plague, beginning in the 1340s in Europe and recurring spo-
radically through the next century, probably skewed adult life expec-
tancy downward, but over the medieval and renaissance period as a
whole, "those who survived childhood had a fair chance of living to
be fifty or sixty, even seventy years of age."196
Second, in the predominantly agrarian premodern world of
Europe and later North America, as had been true in ancient societies,
old age was not in itself associated with cessation of work. The old
were a part of society generally at whatever social level they had been
born to, so that the elderly of the laboring classes were expected to
continue to work,'97 while those with some property or other means
had better options in old age, primarily continued control of property
and family power until death and transfer of both to the next genera-
tion, a familiar pattern from ancient times.'98 In the absence of other
types of support, the elderly who reached the point of complete inca-
pacity were dependent on family, church, or local organized poor re-
lief.199
Third, a more organized approach to old-age provision began to
emerge in this period, both for the peasantry and for the urban skilled
craftsmen. The concept of retirement began to spread beyond the
landed aristocracy, in response to the needs both of the workers, but
also in some cases of their "employers," in this case, the landed nobil-
ity who in some areas tightly controlled the land and conditions of
work of their fiefdoms.2'
195. SHULAMITH SAHAR, GROWING OLD IN THE MIDDLE AGES 171 (Yael Lotar
trans., 1997).
196. Id. at 32.
197. See id. at 171.
198. See id. at 95-97, 147.
199. See id. at 163-70.
200. See generally MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 145-62 (L.A. Manyon trans.,
1961).
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For peasants who controlled their own land, the pattern looks
very much like the millennia-old approach to old-age income secu-
rity-the aging father would either remain in control of the property
and monetary funds even though he ceased to work the property, or
in some areas, "the aging peasant retired and transferred the holding
to one of his sons, who then became the head of the household.""' In
urban areas, the growing skilled craftsman class organized into guilds
early in the medieval period, primarily for protection of each craft's
monopoly over its sphere of work, but also for social welfare pur-
poses. Part of the dues paid by each member into the guild was re-
served for various kinds of assistance for its members, including fi-
nancial support for aged members who were no longer able to pursue
their craft.20 2 Thus, the connection between old-age assistance and at-
tachment to specific employment could be said to have been made at
least by the fourteenth century.
In summary, the historical record through the pre-industrial era
in the West shows remarkable consistency in the treatment of the eld-
erly and the problem of their support, as well as in the expected life-
spans of adults, who appear to have considered themselves "old" only
when they reached age sixty or so. Throughout history, those with
property assured their own financial well-being in old age by control-
ling the terms of transfer of that property to the next generation.
Those without property, on the other hand, worked essentially until
death or until ill-health prevented further work, at which point they
either lived on accumulated savings, with the help of family and
friends, or on the charity of the Church, and later of the government.
B. Purposes of Retirement in an Industrialized World
The development of organized private and public retirement
systems as part of the growth of industrialization has been explored
by numerous scholars,2' so there is no need to discuss the changing
201. SAHAR, supra note 195, at 146. The latter arrangement could involve a
formal maintenance agreement between father and son, perhaps brokered by the
local village leaders, or by the lord of the demesne estate (where the peasant
farmer would be a tenant rather than a landowner), who would protect his interest
in having the land properly worked by a productive laborer.
202. Id. at 136-37.
203. See, e.g., HABER & GRATTON, supra note 4; ORLOFF, supra note 4; JILL
QUADAGNO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF OLD AGE SECURITY: CLASS AND POLITICS IN
THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (1988); THANE, supra note 5.
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patterns of industrialization in detail here. However, in order to ap-
preciate fully the radical change in retirement expectations that began
in the twentieth century, it is necessary to highlight two aspects of the
beginning of the industrial retirement model. On one hand, we see
the persistence of ancient historical patterns in dealing with old-age
support, while on the other, in the wake of major changes in the way
labor was organized and controlled, we see the beginning of a new
approach with retirement reliant on work-based entitlement.
1. PERSISTENT PATTERNS OF INTERGENERATIONAL SUPPORT
There is a remarkable continuity from the premodern to the
modem era in attitudes and prevalent means of income maintenance
and care of the aging. The same themes predominate that we have
seen since ancient times: the primary responsibility of adult children
for the care of parents, the control of resources by the elderly to insure
that their children live up to those responsibilities, the desire of eld-
erly people for independence and continued useful existence, the ex-
pectation of society that working people would work virtually until
death, and the bifurcation of the opportunity to retire-available for
those with means during their working lifetimes, out of reach for
those with a life of work but little accumulated property.
In eighteenth-century England, for example, as the country
moved from agrarian and village organization to industrial labor and
urban center dominance, old age was still thought to begin around
age sixty, and individuals in that age group and above still expected
and desired to remain independent and to work as long as possible.2"
The elderly of all social classes essentially relied on themselves, on
family, and, for those at the bottom end of the economic scale, on local
community assistance for support. 5 Contrary to some popular im-
204. SUSANNAH OTTAWAY, THE DECLINE OF LIFE, OLD AGE IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND 7 (2004).
205. Id.
The locus of responsibilitv for the elderlv is best thought of in terms of
a tripartite divide: the family, the communitv, and the older indi-
viduals themselves. The three were integrally connected, and each
aged individual was likely to rely on some combination of these
sources of support .... Eighteenth-century English families certainly
felt that there was a moral obligation to support their elderlv mem-
bers .... Moreover, this duty was established by law, even if the law
was seldom applied: the poor laws stipulated that children should
support their aged parents .... Clearly, there was a cultural ideal of
familial responsibility for elder-care at this time.
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ages of the experience of aging before Social Security, the three-
generation household, while not uncommon, was more likely to occur
in households of some means, where the elderly were giving assis-
tance rather than needing it.2"6 The lower the household income, the
more likely elderly persons were to be living alone and needing com-
munity assistance. °7
In the United States, industrialization did not fully take hold un-
til after the Civil War and the completion of white settlement of the
American West.2"8 In this still largely agrarian society, the majority of
older Americans worked on family farms, and while retirement was
not unknown, complete cessation of work was unlikely even in old
age.2 °9 However, the classic pattern we have seen stretching back to
ancient Mesopotamia still prevailed in farm families, indeed in all
families with some sort of working property: the older generation
would secure its own support in old age through continued legal con-
trol and ownership of the property, and the conditioning of inheri-
tance by the younger generation on maintenance of the elder until
death.210
The notion of retirement itself was still largely restricted to the
propertied and professional classes, who were expected to save
enough to provide for their old age, through purchase of annuities or
otherwise.21' However, in this period retirement began to be dis-
206. See id. at 7-8.
207. Id. at 8.
208. Jonathan Prude, Town-Factory Conflicts in Antebellum Rural Massachusetts,
in THE COUNTRYSIDE IN THE AGE OF CAPIrALIST TRANSFORMATION 71, 71-102 (Ste-
ven Hahn & Jonathan Prude eds., 1985) (interpreting the agrarian influence in
American patterns of industry). See generally WALTER LICHT, INDUSTRIALIZING
AMERICA: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1995); RICHARD SLOTKIN, THE FATAL
ENVIRONMENT: THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN THE AGE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION
1800-1890 (1985).
209. See HABER & GRATrON, supra note 4, at 29-30:
Gender, marital status, and economic standing controlled farm-family
experience. The myth of the extended farm household had some va-
lidity for the wealthy, married and native-born. Aging male farmers
generally retained the role of household head. Their valued property
encouraged younger members to remain in the household and pro-
vide their assistance.... Poorer families, however, exhibited different
patterns of family structure. The less affluent struggled as hired
hands and subsistence farmers.... Additional family members did
not necessarily contribute to their well-being.
Id. See generally DAVID HACKETr FISCHER, GROWING OLD IN AMERICA (1978).
210. See HABER & GRATrON, supra note 4, at 88-89; see also W. ANDREW
ACHENBAUM, SOCIAL SECURITY: VISIONS AND REVISIONS 105 (1986).
211. See HABER & GRATTON, supra note 4, at 104.
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cussed as something that should be available to the laboring classes,
even though in reality most workers were still expected to work up
until death, and the indigent elderly were at the mercy of whatever
care was available in their local communities.2 12  Despite the rum-
blings of the need for pensions for all, the expectation of most workers
in industrial and farm labor was to work until physical debilitation
prevented further work, with death following shortly thereafter.213
2. RETIREMENT AND INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE LABOR FORCE
The persistence of traditional behavior patterns of families and
aging individuals notwithstanding, the industrial revolution did even-
tually transform the agrarian economy and family-based farm society
both in Western Europe and in the United States, and as a result, be-
gan to change the ways in which individuals and families approached
the care of the aging. As the types of skills necessary for work
changed, new systems of economic support for elderly individuals
who could no longer work in the industrial context came to be seen as
necessary.214 Probably of equal importance to the growth of the idea
of retirement for all is the great increase in overall wealth of American
society, among the aging as well as the young, brought about by in-
dustrialized work and increasing productivity. Although income was
not distributed evenly, and poverty remained a problem in both ur-
ban and rural areas, before the Great Depression there probably was




213. See id. at 71.
214. See ORLOFF, supra note 4, at 99:
The shift to the predominance of waged work concomitant with in-
dustrialization was the critical factor in the increasing economic vul-
nerability of the aged. Further, within the industrial sector, processes
of capitalist rationalization were destructive for older workers as their
skills became technologically obsolete and as employers' interests in
making their work forces efficient increased, trends which became
particularly evident in the 1920s and 1930s.
215. See HABER & GRATTON, supra note 4, at 65-67:
The cost-of-living studies, along with the surveys of the elderly popu-
lation in the 1920s, demonstrate the imposing gains in the economic
welfare of older persons during the industrial period. According to
the surveys, more than half the aged lived in good economic circum-
stances. The remainder divided into three approximately equal
groups: one having sufficient means, another on the verge of de-
pendency, the last wholly dependent on family or charity. Combin-
ing earnings and potential income from wealth, about half the elderly
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Nonetheless, over the course of the nineteenth and into the early
twentieth century, the idea of old-age pensions for ordinary people,
sponsored by both employer and by central governments, began to
take hold both in Western Europe and in the United States.216 The rise
in productivity accompanying industrialization brought higher in-
comes to at least the nonagricultural population, increasing the possi-
bilities for both group and individual old-age retirement annuities.217
A detailed examination of this immensely complex process is beyond
the scope of this article, but it is possible to select two key develop-
ments that laid the groundwork for the social insurance approach to
old age and retirement in the twentieth century: the public pension as
social welfare, and the industrial pension as a labor force management
tool.
First, from veterans' pensions in the United States to early civil
service pensions in England and later in America, government pen-
sions of various sorts essentially paved the way for private industrial
pensions as a labor force management tool. Civil service pensions be-
gan to be paid in England in the late eighteenth century as a part of
anticorruption reform movements; later in the nineteenth century in
the United States, Civil War veterans pensions paved the way for
other types of public and private pensions.2"8 The first true employer
sponsored pensions came in the early nineteenth century in England,
and later in that century in the United States, for railroad and utility
company workers.219 It should be noted that these first pension pro-
had incomes equal to or exceeding the average earnings of male
workers in the 1920s.
216. Id.
217. See COSTA, supra note 166, at 54-57.
218. See OTTAWAY, supra note 204, at 82; see also THANE, supra note 5, at 239:
An effect of the formalized pension system for the middle ranks of the
civil service was to encourage recruitment of younger, fitter
men .... The pensions ... were low in relation to real as distinct from
formal earnings, since most Customs officials supplemented their
earnings... from more or less corrupt fees from mercants and others
with whom they dealt. As such corruption was cleaned up at the end
of the eighteenth century, some compensation was awarded from
1798, in the form of the abolition of the superannuation contribution
and the doubling of pensions.
Id. For U.S. Civil War pensions, see THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 37-71 (1995).
219. For the English experience, see THANE, supra note 5, at 243-48:
In the late seventeenth century occupational pensions had been pro-
vided by statute in private firms closely linked with government and
especially important for national prosperity, including the Bank of
England and the East India Company .... Formal pension schemes
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grams were primarily for what could be called white collar workers in
civil service and skilled positions.22° It took strengthened labor unions
in the United States until the mid-twentieth century to achieve re-
tirement pension coverage for industrial workers in the auto and steel
industries, which sparked the expansion of retirement pension cover-
age to workers in other industries."
The government's strongest role in pension provision came in
veterans' pensions, a role that goes back to the Roman Empire, as
noted earlier. In the United States, government pensions were among
the first benefits granted under the new federal government, to veter-
ans of the Revolutionary War who could demonstrate financial
need.' Sixty years later, the Civil War created the need for a new
veterans' benefit program, this time of much greater scope, duration
and lasting impact. 2 3
One of the most important "innovations" of the American Civil
War was the involvement of a large portion of the total male popula-
tion of both the North and the South. Over two million men-about
thirty-seven percent of military age males in the Union states-served
in the Union army; almost one-fifth of them died from direct or indi-
rect combat related causes, and another 300,000 returned home
wounded. 24 As a direct result of this loss of a wage earner or of earn-
ing capacity as a result of participation in combat by such a large pro-
portion of adult men, Congress established the veterans' pension pro-
gram that, with expansions during and after the Civil War years,
became the first large-scale social welfare program in the United
States.225
developed earliest in the largest and most bureaucratized
firms .... Most of the railway companies by the 1860s ran compul-
sory contributory schemes providing sickness, superannuation and
funeral allowances. They paid pensions of between two shillings and
six shillings weekly after a minimum of twenty-five years' service.
Id. For the American experience, see GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 46, at 27-31.
220. See GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 46, at 27-31; THANE, supra note 5, at
243-48.
221. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 46, at 18-19 (citing Peter Drucker, Pension
Fund "Socialism," PUB. INT. 3 (1976)).
222. See Dilley, supra note 120, at 1095-96 (citing John P. Resch, Federal Welfare
for Revolutionary War Veterans, 56 SOC. SEC. REv. 171, 172 (1982)).
223. Id. at 1099-1100.
224. See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL
ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 103 (1992).
225. Id. at 102-30.
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The historical significance of the Civil War pension program
goes beyond the actual benefits paid to veterans and their families;
even as late as 1910, when surviving Union veterans would have been
in their seventies and late sixties, almost twenty percent of all persons
age sixty-five, in some areas of the United States, were receiving Civil
War pension benefits, a percentage similar to the numbers covered by
European old-age pension programs at that point.226 These numbers
are highly significant because most men over age sixty-five were still
gainfully employed early in the twentieth century-it seems likely,
therefore, that a substantial portion of older American men and their
families who were unable to work were receiving pensions from the
federal government, long before the enactment of Social Security.
Moreover, Civil War pensions should properly be viewed as true
"social welfare" benefits, because the stated aim of the Congress in
enacting the pension program, as well as its repeated expansions
throughout the nineteenth century, was to prevent veterans and their
families from having to suffer the shame of charity support and poor
relief.227 While the Civil War veteran generation generally had passed
away by the early 1920s, clearly the children and grandchildren of
those veterans were familiar, by the time of the Social Security Act of
1935, with the idea of a federal role in poverty prevention for the eld-
erly who could no longer work.
The other major development of the late nineteenth into the
twentieth centuries was the beginning of true employer-provided
pension plans as a tool for work force management and the establish-
ment of retirement as at least a goal for more than the most highly
paid minority of workers. American employers instituted a variety of
"private social welfare" efforts in the late nineteenth century which
gradually developed into employer-sponsored group savings plans,
and finally into true stock purchase and pension plans, serving as
both a source of capital and as a way of retaining and then easing out
valued older employees.228
Early private pension plans in the United States were not par-
ticularly reliable as a support for broad-based retirement-few work-
ers were covered by any plan, few, if any, plans were funded in ad-
226. Id. at 129.
227. Id. at 148-51.
228. See ORLOFF, supra note 4, at 98; see also GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 46,
at 27-59; Dilley, supra note 121, at 1198.
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vance, and most workers were not vested in any benefit unless they
retired while still in the sponsoring employer's pay. 9 The likelihood
of ever receiving such a pension was not high because of these rules
and employer reluctance to make good even on the few promises al-
ready made. In fact, employer groups began discussing the problem
of adequately funding the pension promises already made to their
employees as early as 1925, long before the catastrophic stock market
crash of 1929 and the widespread termination of employer pension
plans during the economic depression of the 1930s.230 Despite funding
difficulties, however, employers began to see sponsoring a retirement
pension program for their employees as a way to further their own
goals of managing their work forces-through the use of long vesting
requirements, they could encourage their most valued employees to
stay with the company, without immediate outlays in increased sal-
ary. In addition, funded pension trusts were valuable pools of capital
for investment."
The stage was set for a broad-based, three-tiered true retirement
system, based on a federally funded social welfare benefit program
based on service or employment, limited employer-sponsored pen-
sions, and individual savings. Nonetheless, retirement was not yet a
widespread experience or expectation of most workers, who contin-
ued to work well past the age of sixty-five until after the enactment of
Social Security; even immediately after World War II, almost half of
men over age sixty-five remained in the work force.232
229. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 46, at 127.
230. See GORDON, supra note 25, at 253-57.
231. Id. at 245-46. Gordon cites the example of stock ownership plans:
Proponents advertised stock plans as guarantees of loyalty and effi-
ciency, but their operation betrayed more mundane concerns. For
employers, the oversubscription of World War I Liberty Bonds and
the precedent of financing such purchases through payroll deductions
suggested an untapped source of capital: workers themselves ....
Plainly intended to raise capital rather than redistribute ownership,
only one-third of 496 plans studied in 1929 purchased stocks already
on the market. Sale of stocks to employees occurred primarily in ex-
panding, nonunion industries.... Most plans forced workers to pay
for a block of stocks in installments, limiting both control of stock and
its resale.
Id. Obviously, given the current experience of § 401(k) plans and employer stock
purchase, employer goals have not changed much in the last eighty years.
232. See ORLOFF, supra note 4, at 97-102 ("The issues of retirement and the
problems of older workers may have gained salience in the 1920s and 1930s, but it
is important to remember that mass retirement, predicated on a public retirement
wage, is a post World War II phenomenon."); JAMES H. SCHULZ, THE ECONOMICS
OF AGING 65 (6th ed. 1995).
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C. Melding of Retirement and Care of Aging in the Twentieth
Century
The history of aging in the Western world demonstrates that
throughout most of human history, the responsibility for providing of
the necessities of life in old age largely rested with the old themselves,
mainly through continued control of property worked by the next
generation, or labor until death. Retirement was a rarity until the late
nineteenth century and even then was largely restricted to those with
status and means to support a genteel existence in old age; charity and
community welfare support was, at the other end of the wealth and
power spectrum, restricted to the helpless and powerless.23
The beginning of the twentieth century saw the stirrings of sup-
port for a retirement pension system, predicated on attachment to the
work force, but voluntary depending on the employer's decision to
sponsor a pension plan.2" After the collapse of private retirement ar-
rangements along with other American economic institutions during
the depression of the 1930s, retirement seemed less essential than
simply staving off starvation and homelessness in old age to many re-
formers.235 However, the enactment of Social Security, with its meld-
ing of entitlement to retirement pensions for virtually all workers with
old-age antipoverty measures, essentially launched the institution of
retirement that took hold in the post-World War II era.2" It is this in-
novation of the combination of pension entitlement and poverty pre-
vention functions that is currently under attack.
1. THE SOCIAL INSURANCE INNOVATION
The development of mechanisms for providing old-age pensions
for workers in certain industries was a necessary element of the indus-
trial revolution and the mechanization of work itself. As work be-
came less and less a matter of individual self-directed craft and in-
creasingly a matter of working under supervision, by the clock, for an
employer and with machinery, older workers began to be valued only
up to the point of perceived inefficiency and obsolescence. Retirement
233. See generally MICHAEL KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986).
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began to be seen as a way to regularize this obsolescence, without
demoralizing the rest of the work force. 37
Nonetheless, most American men continued to work past age
sixty-five until the post-World War II era, and the minority of work-
ers who did retire did so based on private retirement arrangements,
either informal (family farm maintenance arrangements, for example)
or formal (privately purchased annuities or employer-provided pen-
sions).3 As a result, both those who relied on earnings in old age and
those who relied on private arrangements for old-age income support
were extremely vulnerable to the collapse in monetary and property
values caused by the 1929 stock market crash and the worldwide eco-
nomic depression that followed. 3 9
It is difficult for contemporary readers to fully appreciate the ex-
tent of the disaster of the Great Depression, but many of its most sali-
ent effects had a particularly devastating effect on the old. Worldwide
price deflation created a downward price spiral in personal and real
property. Rising unemployment and falling wages for the jobs that
remained depleted the ability of working age children to support their
elderly relatives. Widespread bank failures destroyed the life savings
of the elderly, with no federal bank insurance program in place to sal-
vage any of their accounts.2' The spillover effect on pension plans
was predictably disastrous: funded plans became unable to pay bene-
fits as the banks in which pension trusts were held went bankrupt,
237. See James A. Wooten, The 'Original Intent' of The Federal Tax Treatment of
Private Pension Plans, 85 TAx NOTES 1305, 1307-08 (1999); see also ORLOFF, supra
note 4, at 100-01.
238. As late as 1931, over half of all men over age sixty-five remained in the
paid labor force, and it is likely that most men in their mid to late sixties continued
to work and support themselves and their spouses. By 1941, that percentage had
dropped to forty-four percent, which may reflect sustained high unemployment
rates during the Great Depression more than an increase in voluntary retirement.
See ORLOFF, supra note 4, at 97-98.
239. See GORDON, supra note 25, at 160; see also HABER & GRATTON, supra note
4, at 42.
240. Introduction, in THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds.,
1998).
In terms of its impact on economic performance, the depression was a
disaster without equal in the twentieth century. The contraction
phase of the depression, extending from August 1929 to March 1933,
saw the most severe decline in key economic aggregates in the annals
of U.S. business cycle history. Real GNP fell by more than one-third,
as did the price level. Industrial production declined by more than
fifty percent. Unemployment rose to twenty-five percent by 1933.
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and unfunded plans simply stopped paying benefits as the sponsoring
employers either retrenched or went out of business.24'
The New Deal response to widespread economic disaster took
many forms, but one of the most long lasting and widely effective
measures was the enactment of Social Security, and along with it,
various federal and state partnered antipoverty programs. Again, a
complete description of the development of Social Security is beyond
the scope of this article, and I have analyzed the relationship between
the idea of entitlement and Social Security's role in preventing pov-
erty in the context of retirement elsewhere in some detail."4 A distilla-
tion of my argument is sufficient here to show how Social Security
provided a bridge from early industrialization's tentative moves to-
ward a worker retirement ethos to the late twentieth century's retire-
ment expectation. The two most important elements built into Social
Security's design were entitlement, based on earnings, and redistribu-
tion in the benefit formula and family benefit structure, both of which
are the focus of privatization attacks today. Together, they formed the
basis for the retirement expectation that was cemented in the Ameri-
can workers' consciousness in the years following World War II.
The Social Security Act of 1935 was at first, somewhat limited at-
tempt to put a federal pension program into place, with limited anti-
poverty features, and little immediate effect, because first benefits
would not have been paid until 1942. However, the Social Security
program as revised in 1939 took the shape it has essentially had ever
since-benefit entitlement based on lifetime earnings in the paid work
force; pay-as-you-go financing; compulsory coverage for employment
determined legislatively; no means-testing of benefits; and a benefit
formula, including spousal and survivor benefits, weighted in favor of
low-income workers.243
The most pressing immediate need of the elderly at the time was
probably to secure adequate sources of income for those in desperate
straits, and the Old-Age Assistance program, providing needs-based
elements to the elderly, was the immediate answer.24 However, the
long-term focus of the Committee on Economic Security, appointed by
President Roosevelt to make the recommendations that led to the 1935
241. See GORDON, supra note 25, at 160.
242. See Dilley, supra note 120.
243. Id. at 1126.
244. Id.
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Social Security Act, was centered on a retirement system that com-
bined an earnings-based entitlement with strong redistributive ele-
ments.245 The express purpose of this design was to prevent poverty
in old age through a unified retirement program that would cover all
workers and their families, which the designers hoped would mean
virtually all Americans once the economy recovered and employment
rates improved.24
Entitlement was assured through the benefit eligibility structure,
which was based on substantial years of work in employment covered
by the system.247 The financing structure, built around payroll taxes
on employee wages and a matching tax on employers, reinforced the
public and political belief that benefits had, in fact, been "paid for,"
securing future retirement income with something like a property
right. Of course, this is not literally the case, but politically it might as
well be-no Congress or President has ever reduced Social Security
benefits in current payment status, even during the most serious
short-term financial crisis of the system in the late 1970s and early
1980s.24
The other critical design element is the redistributive benefit
formula and structure-the combination of antipoverty benefit design
and work-based entitlement is the single transformative hallmark of
Social Security that virtually created retirement as we know it in mod-
ern America. At the time, the designers may have had some interest
also in labor force management, a familiar private pension goal; at
least some New Dealers were convinced that a program to regularize
retirement from the labor force was important for maintaining strong
employment levels.24 9 But the features that would make retirement a
reality for lower- and middle-income Americans were not like any-
245. Id. at 1127-28.
246. Id. at 1131.
247. LARRY DEWITT, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE SOCIAL SECURITY RETIREMENT EARNINGS TEST (1999), at http://www.ssa.gov/
history/ret2.html ("A contributory annuity system... will enable younger work-
ers, with the aid of their employers, to build up gradually their rights to annuities
in their old age.").
248. See Dilley, supra note 120, at 1033. As President Roosevelt said some years
later: "I guess you're right on the economics, but those taxes were never a prob-
lem of economics. They are politics all the way through. We put those payroll
contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral and political right
to collect their pensions and their unemployment benefits. With those taxes in
there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program."
249. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN
DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945, at 257 (1999).
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thing offered in private pensions: family benefits, including for
spouses and surviving children and spouses, without any reduction in
the primary worker's benefit; a benefit formula weighted in favor of
lower wage workers; and complete portability of coverage from one
job to the next, so that lifetime earnings would underwrite eventual
benefits regardless of the number of jobs the worker had held.25 °
These features embody the social insurance principle of insuring
workers against risks that private pensions are not designed to take
account of, such as periods of unemployment or low education that
prevents access to high-paying work. Under social insurance princi-
ples, these are social, as well as individual, risks because ignoring
their consequences could lead to social instability and dangerous dis-
parities in income levels. It should not be forgotten that the Russian
Revolution had occurred a mere fifteen years prior to the election of
Franklin Roosevelt, a scion of the American monied upper class, and
few policy makers in the New Deal could ignore the lessons of social
and economic unrest which roiled Europe throughout the 1920s. A
stable and dependable retirement system for working people could
greatly contribute to eliminating political insecurity as well as eco-
nomic insecurity-and it did.
2. THE FLOWERING OF THE RETIREMENT EXPECTATION
The post-World War II era saw the solid establishment of the re-
tirement expectation for middle- and even lower-income workers, as
Social Security coverage gradually expanded to most American work-
ers and benefits were gradually increased.25' Private pension plan
coverage expanded exponentially, partly because of labor union col-
lective bargaining, which covered most of the large manufacturing
employers, placed a premium on achieving retirement pension cover-
age. 2
52
250. See Robert M. Ball, The 1939 Amendments to the Social Security Act and What
Followed, in 50TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC
SECURITY OF 1935 AND OTHER BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 162-67 (1985).
251. Coverage was gradually extended, beginning in 1950 and extending
through 1983, to cover farm workers, clergy, self-employed persons, including
small business owners, and finally government employees. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN.
OFFICE OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 2003
tbl.2.A1, available at http: / /www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/
2003/2a1-2a7.html.
252. See SCHULZ, supra note 232, at 228; see also GRAEBNER, supra note 164, at
215-21.
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The best indication of the solidification of retirement in Ameri-
can life is the steady downward decline of labor force participation
rates of men over age sixty; from 1960 to 2000, the average age of re-
tirement, that is, cessation of regular full-time work, steadily declined
from sixty-six to 63.6.3 The percentage of American men continuing
to work past age sixty-five declined from just under fifty percent to
less than twenty percent in 1992;2 the comparison for women is diffi-
cult to make, because women only began entering the full-time work
force in great numbers in the late 1960s.2"
For small employers, the pension tax laws provided a great op-
portunity for using pensions as tax shelters as well as pension vehicles
for the owners, without necessarily extending meaningful coverage or
benefits to their lower paid employees.' Pension coverage for U.S.
workers never, even at its probable height in the early to mid-1970s,
exceeded sixty percent and many workers, while experiencing cover-
age at some point during their working lives, probably reached re-
tirement with very little in the way of retirement resources other than
Social Security. 27 During the 1980s, and continuing to the present
day, almost sixty percent of American retirees relied on Social Security
benefits for more than half of their retirement income: for almost
thirty percent of them, Social Security constituted virtually their sole
retirement income.
25 8
The expansion of Social Security as a source of retirement in-
come probably played the largest role in solidifying American work-
ers' expectation that they could retire at or close to age sixty-five
253. See Richard Johnson, Why the 'Average Age of Retirement' Is a Misleading
Measure of Labor Supply, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 2001 at 38, tbl.2. In labor force
participation terms, the change is more stark-in 1960, 30.6% of men age sixty-five
and older were in the labor force, while in 2000, only 17.5% of that group were in
the labor force. Id.
254. See SCHULZ, supra note 232.
255. Id.
256. See generally Halperin, supra note 45.
257. See Munnell et al., supra note 3, at 9 fig.9.
258. In 2000, Social Security benefits provided over half the income for sixty-
four percent of all Social Security beneficiaries age sixty-five and older. See SOC.
SEC. ADMIN. OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION AND STATISTICS, INCOME OF AGED
CHARTBOOK, available at http: / /www.ssa.gov /policy/docs/chartbooks/
income.aged/2000/iacOO.html#income. This statistic appears to have remained
remarkably stable, since in 1988, over half of all households headed by a person
sixty-five or older similarly depended on Social Security benefits for at least fifty
percent of total income. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101ST
CONG., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS WMCP: 101-29, at 1015 tbl.17 (1990
GREEN BOOK) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK].
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without descending into abject poverty. In the years following World
War II, coverage under Social Security was expanded beyond the ini-
tial industrial manufacturing base to reach farm workers, employees
in any regular commercial activity, and self-employed professionals.259
By 1983, when Federal government workers were covered and State
and local governments were no longer allowed to withdraw from the
system, Social Security covered the vast majority of American work-
ers.2" Finally, with the enactment of Medicare in 1964, the last re-
maining area of insecurity in old age, catastrophic medical expenses,
was in large part addressed through a social insurance approach.
2 61
The role of Social Security benefits in financing individual re-
tirements also grew, particularly after the institution of automatic cost
of living increases in 1972, which interestingly was advocated by
President Nixon as a conservative move to preempt more generous ad
hoc benefit increases that Congress had repeatedly passed in the pre-
ceding two decades.262 In 1977, the final step of indexing the wage re-
cord on which the initial benefit is calculated completed the virtual
integration of Social Security benefits with the rise and fall of the na-
tional economy.
The enormous significance of wage indexing Social Security
benefits is largely hidden from the public, who have been told time
and again that the future financing problems of the system will be
caused by the larger percentage of the population that will be over
sixty-five and living to older ages.2' However, if the benefit structure
259. See Johnson, supra note 253.
260. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 101, 97 Stat.
67, 67-70 (1983).
261. See Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, Health Insurance for the Aged
and Disabled, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396(c) (West 2004).
262. See President Nixon's Special Message to the Congress on Social Security
(Sept. 25, 1969), available at http://ssa.gov/history/nixstmts.html (advocating pas-
sage of automatic cost of living increases: "By acting to make future benefit raises
automatic with rises in the cost of living, we remove questions about future years;
we do much to remove this system from biennial politics; and we make fair treat-
ment of beneficiaries a matter of certainty rather than a matter of hope.").
263. See Bill Frenzel, Bold Steps to Help Social Security, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 16,
2004, at A19:
Despite its successes, though, the retirement program will be stressed
when baby boomers start retiring at the rate of 10,000 a day in 2008.
First, when Social Security was enacted, the average life expectancy
was 60. Today, thanks to health and medical advancements, it is 78.
In fact, those over 80 years of age are now the fastest growing seg-
ment of our population. Second, 30 years ago there were five workers
supporting every Social Security recipient. Today that ratio is 3.4
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were static, that is, not linked to increases in wage productivity, those
numbers would not necessarily create much of a financing problem,
because initial benefit levels would not be nearly as high if they were
based on nonindexed wage levels.' It is not an understatement to
say that because of the two types of indexing used in the Social Secu-
rity benefit structure, the portion of the American economy devoted to
Social Security benefits is basically fixed, changing only as the num-
bers of the elderly increase. As the economic pie grows, the slice de-
voted to Social Security keeps pace and will increase as the number of
beneficiaries grows.
Once the economic foundations for broad-based retirement were
established, the marketing of retirement began to take hold, particu-
larly once § 401(k) plans began to expand and investment advisors
saw the possibilities for expanding their client base to large segments
of the middle and upper-middle class.2" The latter third of the twen-
tieth century saw the expansion of whole industries-"over-fifty-five"
housing developments, leisure cruises, and other activities aimed at
"active seniors"-built around the idea that almost all workers would
stop working at or before age sixty-five, because they would have a
stable source of lifetime income.266
Programs for poor elderly persons continue to provide benefits
for those who have too little income from other sources to get by, pri-
marily under the federal-state Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
program, the successor to the New Deal's Old-Age Assistance.2 67 But,
workers per retiree. By the year 2030 (when the baby boom genera-
tion is fully retired), the ratio will be 2 to 1.
264. See Halperin, supra note 43, at 39.
265. For example, Fidelity has set up an entire investor newsletter aimed spe-
cifically at seniors to whom they want to market financial advice:
New! Retirement Income Guide for Senior Investors, In September
2004 we began monthly publishing of the Fidelity Independent Ad-
viser Retirement Income Guide, dedicated to helping you plan and
manage your income during retirement. The Retirement Income Guide
is focused on portfolios and advice to, 1. Protect your wealth 2. Gen-
erate retirement income 3. Make strategic moves in anticipation of the
market 4. React quickly to changing market conditions.
http://www.fidelityadviser.com.
266. For example, an entire website, "Retirement Net," can be accessed at
http: / /www.retirenet.com/ to find the perfect retirement community; see also Re-
tire... Florida, at http://www.fl-esi.com/retliving/2-cm.htm, for a similar web-
site devoted to Florida opportunities.
267. Title XVI of the Social Security Act:
The... SSI ... program is a means-tested, federally administered in-
come assistance program .... Established by the 1972 amendments to
the Social Security Act (Public Law 92-603) and begun in 1974, SSI
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as the drafters of the Social Security Act had predicted in the 1930s,
the numbers of impoverished elderly who had no claim on the earn-
ings-based benefit system under Social Security dwindled over the
course of the century, to the point that by the 1990s, SSI had become
primarily a disability benefit program for poor disabled persons.2
68
The issue of how to care for the aging had in fact been largely set-
tled-earnings based redistributive entitlements, both public and pri-
vate, provided for retirement and old-age support until death.
This is the established retirement order that has come under at-
tack over the last twenty years. First, changes in employment patterns
combined with the gradual diminution of employer commitment to
pension provisions, -among other reasons, has led to a decline in main-
tenance and establishment of defined benefit plans providing a life-
time stream of income to retirees. Next, along with the decline of the
defined benefit model came the substitution of highly marketed em-
ployer sponsored savings plans substantially invested in employer
stock and strongly affected by market swings, leaving employees with
little security for retirement in the event of a market and economic
downturn, as occurred beginning in 2000. Finally, the relentless as-
sault on Social Security began around 1980 with the election of Ronald
Reagan, which coincided with short-term financing problems that
eventually impelled passage of refinancing and reform legislation that
secured the program's ability to pay benefits until (currently) around
2040.269 The question facing policymakers now is what will be the re-
sult if these attacks succeed.
The promotion of private and employer-sponsored individual
savings arrangements as the best way to finance retirement is essen-
tially based on an enormous leap of faith unsupported by current or
past experience. Workers are in fact disproving the claim that indi-
provides monthly cash payments... to needy aged, blind and dis-
abled persons. The SSI program replaced the former Federal grants to
the State for old age assistance, aid to the blind and aid to the perma-
nently disabled.
See GREEN BOOK, supra note 258, at 699.
268. In 1975, of the 3.9 million people receiving SSI benefits, just over half, 2.0
million, were sixty-five aged, and 1.9 million were disabled or blind; by 2003, 1.1
million SSI recipients were aged, while 5.5 million were blind or disabled. See SOC.
SEC. ADMIN., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SSI PROGRAM tbl.IV.B6, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/SSIR/SSI04/Participants.html#wp439058.
269. See Paul Pierson & Miriam Smith, Shifting Fortunes of the Elderly: The Com-
parative Politics of Retrenchment, in ECONOMIC SECURITY AND INTERGENERATIONAL
JUSTICE 27 (Theodore Marmor et al. eds., 1994).
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viduals can save for their own secure retirement by continuing to
work past retirement age in greater numbers since the late 1990s and
the downturn in the stock market and the economy.27 Without the
certainty of at least a basic source of income through the end of life,
workers will not, and indeed should not, stop working, and thus the
institution of retirement itself could not be sustained in such an envi-
ronment.
III. Can We and Should We Preserve Retirement?
Old age has always and will always have to involve some de-
pendence on others, if for nothing else, to support the elderly person's
consumption of goods and services when production and self-support
are no longer possible. The historical record shows the pattern that
prevailed for millennia in the absence of redistributive public pro-
grams-the old controlled resources to insure their own care in old
age from the younger generation, usually families as last support,
while those elderly who did not control property experienced a high
poverty level among the old.
History also shows that while the modem era is not exceptional
in having a substantial portion of its population over age sixty, the
postindustrial age is exceptional in the degree of surplus production
made possible by technology and modem organization of industry
270. See Kelly Greene, Many Older Professionals Delay Their Retirement, WALL ST.
J. Online, at http://www.careerjoumal.com/myc/retirement/20031002-greene.
html ("Many older workers are planning to push their final retirement dates into
their 70s, or in some cases their 80s, according to a new study, largely because of
deep nest-egg losses. The survey, released in late September, was conducted for
AARP, a Washington advocacy group for people age 50 and older. The findings
uantify a significant shift in older Americans' retirement goals, resulting largely
rom the combination of the stock-market downturn, historically low interest rates
on conservative investments favored by retirees, and widespread cutbacks in re-
tiree health benefits."); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RETIREMENT AGE AND THE
NEED FOR SAVING, EcONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF (May 12, 2004), at
www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?Index=5419&sequence=0.
Labor force data suggest that some workers are indeed working
longer and that the long-term trend toward earlier retirement may
have ceased or even reversed. Participation in the labor force by peo-
ple ages 65 and over-both men and women-declined for many
years until the mid-1980s, but it has risen modestly since then. For
people ages 55 to 64, the patterns are slightly different: labor force
participation by men declined until the mid-1990s and has since
turned upward; participation by women has been climbing more or
less continuously for half a century, though with a relatively stable
period in the 1970s and 1980s ....
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and agriculture. The problem we now face is not that the elderly will
comprise an increasingly high percentage of our total population; it is
that we must decide how our surplus production of goods and ser-
vices is best distributed in order to care for the nonworking portion of
our population.
The debate on all of these trends has focused on whether the in-
stitutions that currently pay for retirement are adequate, are afford-
able, and sustainable over the long run. But the real questions are
more fundamental-is retirement itself feasible into the remainder of
the twenty-first century? And even if feasible, is retirement as cur-
rently advertised-an extended period of leisure without diminution
in the standard of living beginning in the late sixties-desirable as a
matter of social policy? Finally, if retirement is "too expensive," will
reduction or elimination of redistributive entitlements return the eld-
erly in America to the situation that faced generations of old people
before the enactment of Social Security and the growth of private pen-
sions: work until death or disability prevents it, followed by charity
or reliance on children?
First, is the institution of retirement as it has evolved in the latter
half of the twentieth century sustainable into the twenty-first century?
The foundation of that institution-Social Security-is clearly viable
for the next seventy-five years, with some relatively minor tweaking,
as discussed below. The private pension system, however, is in seri-
ous trouble, and it is unclear that employers will be willing or able to
restore true pension guarantees that will reliably underwrite em-
ployee retirement.
Various suggestions have been made to shore up the employer
pension leg of the three-legged retirement stool, both to extend cover-
age to workers who are not now covered by any type of pension ar-
rangement and to induce employers to make their existing and any
future pension arrangements more equitable for low-income work-
ers.271 Some of these suggestions would place more stringent re-
quirements for coverage of all an employer's workers under a plan,
and perhaps provide additional incentives to cover such employees.272
Others would encourage formation of more employer-provided sav-
271. See Halperin, supra note 43, at 45-73; see also Jefferson, supra note 55; Stein
& Diley, supra note 45.
272. See Halperin, supra note 43.
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ings plans that would involve more employer contributions and safer
investment policies. 73
These suggestions could improve the likelihood of workers hav-
ing some sort of private retirement savings when they reach old age.
Unfortunately, they still depend on voluntary actions by employers,
in a system which at this point continues to allow highly paid em-
ployees to defer almost infinite amounts of compensation, both
through cash deferrals and various kinds of stock purchase arrange-
ments, without necessitating any provision for rank and file employ-
ees at all. 274 Legislation has recently been enacted to attempt to place
some restrictions on the ability to defer income for executives 275-it
remains to be seen whether these changes will affect executive ar-
rangements enough to begin to strengthen private employer plans for
rank and file employees.
Suggestions for solving the long-term deficit for Social Security
also abound, ranging from increased payroll taxes to decreased bene-
fits to increasing the retirement age to changes in the cost of living
measurement system. For example, most recent analysts agree that
lifting the cap on earnings on which payroll taxes are levied, com-
bined with some increase in rates at some point in the next ten years,
would essentially eliminate the long-term financial deficit of the pro-
gram.
A more fundamental place to start, however, would be the
grounding of all three pillars of the American retirement system-
pensions earned through work. Our traditional approaches are all
employment and employer based: the public earnings-based system
of Social Security, the privately sponsored pension system dependent
on voluntary action of individual employers, and individual savings
which are indirectly dependent on employment and earnings. Tying
future retirement income to past work has been a largely unexamined
principle underlying old-age pensions for centuries in Western
Europe and particularly in the United States. Political support for the
Social Security system has in all likelihood rested on the view of
workers paying into the system that they have earned their benefits
and have an unalienable right to them.
273. See Munnell et al., supra note 3.
274. Halperin, supra note 43, at 45-47.
275. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 885(2004).
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Cultural imperatives may still dictate a requirement of work his-
tory for receipt of any type of benefits, but expansion of Social Secu-
rity benefits, flexible access to benefits, and increased financing
through income and corporate taxes rather than solely payroll taxes,
can all still require an earnings credit system while still allowing de-
tachment of old-age security from employment per se. There are
many options for redesigning our public and private benefit system-
but they all will require increased redistribution of resources from rich
to poor in order to prevent lower- and even middle-income elderly
from falling into abject poverty and working long past the time their
health would dictate retirement. We need to explore a citizen-based
public approach, to bolster retirement in the face of possible employer
unwillingness or inability to maintain the voluntary private approach.
Finally, our notions of retirement itself should evolve to match
changes in longevity, health, and work over the last several decades.
The industrial revolution created a need to ease older workers out of
mechanically demanding jobs, while the Great Depression instilled
the idea in both workers and policy makers that older workers needed
to retire to make way for the younger generation in jobs requiring
technical skill, as the nature of work evolves, through technological
innovations like computers and long distance wireless communica-
tion. However, these imperatives may be vanishing. In addition, as
the relatively smaller post-baby boom generations reach maturity,
employers are beginning to discover a need for workers in some jobs
that younger employees may not necessarily be willing or able to take.
I would argue that we need to rethink the whole notion of a
fixed "retirement" age, in the sense of an age when work ceases and
leisure begins, lasting through the rest of life. Meaningful occupation,
suited to the individual's health and strength as he ages, should be
available in a part time or phase down setting as individuals age. It
seems unlikely that workers aged twenty-five to sixty-five will con-
tinue to be willing to finance extended periods of nonproductive ac-
tivity that currently last from birth to after college, and that begin
again in the late sixties and frequently last as long as twenty to thirty
years. No aging person whose physical and mental condition impairs
her ability to work should be required to do so; but we should explore
ways to amend the current programs to encourage productive work in
more flexible settings for a longer, and probably healthier, life in old
age.
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IV. Conclusion
Nos ignoramus, quid sit matura sectus; scire aevi meretum, non numer-
are decet (Let us refuse to know the meaning of ripe old age. Better
to know Time's worth, than count his years.)
2 7 6
It took the cataclysm of the Great Depression in the 1930s to
convince Americans at all income levels that public shared responsi-
bility and some redistribution of wealth through the tax and social
welfare systems was necessary for the survival of capitalist democra-
cies. Assuring a dignified, if not wealthy, old age for most Americans
came to be accepted as a matter of social responsibility, rather than of
individual or family fortune, in the wake of the worldwide failure of
capital accumulation to stave off poverty in old age for most people.
The other major element in the retirement system, the private pension
system, matured over the post-World War II period as a tool for em-
ployers to insure orderly exit from labor force while maintaining good
employer-employee relations. Taken together, the public and private
systems focused on ensuring a stream of income for consumption in
retirement, which diminished both the need for capital accumulation
before retirement and the uncertainty about adequacy of income to
the end of life that previously had kept older workers in the labor
force or dependent on immediate family members.
Memories have faded, however, over the last seventy years, and
a "devil take the hindmost" economy has dramatically undercut pub-
lic support for economic approaches based on shared risk and respon-
sibility. Conservative economists, led by Martin Feldstein, have been
beating the drum for the last thirty years for a return to economic in-
security, which can be seen as a capitalist imperative: insecurity about
future income in old age drives capital accumulation, theoretically in-
creasing the savings rate. 2' At the same time, the private pension sys-
tem has undergone a dramatic shift away from employer responsibil-
ity and toward individual employee risk, in the form of retirement
276. Ausonius, urging his wife to ignore the arrival of old age when it comes,
and to always call one another iuvenis and puella, cited in PARKIN, supra note 177, at
23.
277. For Feldstein's steadfast opposition over the decades to Social Security,
see Martin S. Feldstein, Should Social Security Be Means-Tested?, 95 1. POL. ECON. 468
(1987). See generally MARTIN FELDSTEIN, WOULD PRIVATIZING SOCIAL SECURITY
RAISE EcONOMIc WELFARE? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper 5281,
1995). But see also Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Zeldes, Social Security Privatiza-
tion: A Structure for Analysis, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 363, 366 (1996) ("Overall, it seems
precarious to build a case for privatization based on the argument that it would
increase national savings.").
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savings plans, such as § 401(k) plans, which are displacing traditional
defined benefit plans that insure an income stream in old age.
The result is the undermining of the retirement expectation for
workers at average and below-average income levels, and more gen-
erally, the decay of a major pillar of middle-class life and work in the
United States. While the debate over the last twenty years has cen-
tered on possible replacements for Social Security as the foundation of
retirement, it is my contention that Social Security and the system of
social insurance generally must be expanded to gradually transform
the traditional employer-based pension system if the institution of re-
tirement is to last very far into the twenty-first century. Placing the
burden of retirement security on individual employers is no longer
effective or fair-if we as a society wish to maintain the institution of
retirement for all of the working population, financing that institution
must be a societywide responsibility.
In addition, our notions of retirement itself must change as the
healthy lifespan of most people lengthens-the notion of "old age"
beginning in the midsixties has begun to change, and our idea of the
proper working life span must change as well. The common wisdom
reflecting the changing reality of life spans has been that the retire-
ment age under Social Security must be raised. I argue that raising the
age of eligibility for benefits, as was done in the 1983 Social Security
Amendments, is punitive for those who must retire, and ineffective
for those who can choose when to retire. We need a more flexible ap-
proach, one that allows gradual diminution of work and effort, while
still providing necessary income for those who, because of ill health or
dramatic shifts in working opportunities, cannot find work later in
life.
Both parts of my suggested reform program lead to the same
general conclusion-we need a citizen-based, rather than a strictly
employment-based old-age income support system. As the nature of
work itself continues to evolve, a system financed by payroll taxes
will be under increasing pressure as the payroll base itself changes.
The financial burden of assuring a secure and dignified old age for all
Americans should be shared by all those--corporations and individu-
als alike-who benefit from the financial and social stability such a
program insures. The ultimate solution for reforming Social Security
is to make it both more "social" and more capable of assuring more
"security" for all workers, at all income levels.
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